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Abstract
Increasing air traffic and urbanisation has led to a cluttered airspace, particularly near
airports, where both complex terrain and multiple moving obstacles are frequent. Ac-
curately and efficiently predicting violations in safe separation criteria for commercial
aircraft, a process called conflict detection, is therefore crucial in assessing risk associated
with threats of collision. Existing avoidance systems in operation such as TCAS, EGPWS
and ATC exhibit shortcomings, leaving room for uncertainty and possible conflict scen-
arios. A single on-board system capable of minimising errors in prediction would inform
conflict resolution decisions more accurately as well as support the notion of free flight, an
objective of next-generation air traffic management systems.
This thesis investigates the viability of a modern algorithm, probability flow, as a method of
probabilistic conflict detection for commercial aircraft in airport environments. Simulation
results for realistic flight scenarios are presented in comparison with a ground-truth result
obtained through Monte Carlo simulation. Observations are made regarding the suitability
of probability flow for real-world application. It is found that probability flow is capable
of calculating a tight upper bound to the probability of conflict quickly and accurately
for most conflict scenarios. However, unreasonably large overestimates on the probability
of conflict are obtained when flying parallel to an obstacle conflict region. This problem
could lead to a high frequency of false alerts, particularly in aborted landing scenarios
and at airports operating parallel runways. It is therefore advised that further research
be conducted to resolve this problem before probability flow can be reliably implemented
in an airport environment.
ii
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Opsomming
Toenemende lugverkeer en verstedeliking het gelei tot ‘n deurmekaar lugruim, veral naby
lughawens, waar byde komplekse terrein en verskeie bewegende struikelblokke gereeld voor-
kom. Akkuraat en doeltreffende voorspelling van oortredings in veilige skeidingskriteria
vir kommersiële vliegtuie, naamlik konflik opsporing, is dus van kardinale belang in die
beoordeling van die risiko wat verband hou met dreigemente van ‘n botsing. Bestaande ver-
myding stelsels in werking soos TCAS, EGPWS en ATC toon tekortkominge, wat ruimte
laat vir onsekerheid en moontlike konflik scenario’s. ‘n Enkele aanboordstelsel, wat in
staat is om foute in voorspelling te verminder, sou konflikresolusie besluite meer akkuraat
in kennis stel, asook om die idee van vrye vlug te ondersteun, ‘n doelwit van toekomstige
lugverkeer beheerstelsels.
Hierdie tesis ondersoek die lewensvatbaarheid van ‘n moderne algoritme, waarskynlikheids-
vloei, as ‘n metode van probabilistiese konflik opsporing vir kommersiële vliegtuie in die
lughawens omgewing. Simulasie resultate vir realistiese vlug scenario’s word aangebied
in vergelyking met ‘n grond-waarheid resultaat wat verkry word deur middel van Monte
Carlo simulasie. Waarnemings word gemaak ten opsigte van die geskiktheid van waarskyn-
likheidsvloei vir die werklikheid. Dit is bevind dat waarskynlikheidsvloei in staat is om die
berekening van ‘n stywe bogrens tot die waarskynlikheid van konflik vinnig en akkuraat
te bepaal vir die meeste konflik scenario’s. Tog is daar ‘n onredelike groot oorskatting
op die waarskynlikheid van konflik wat verkry word wanneer ‘n vliegtuig parallel met ‘n
hindernis konflik streek vlieg. Hierdie probleem kan lei tot ‘n hoë frekwensie van valse
waarskuwings, veral in mislukte landing scenario’s en by lughawens wat van parallel aan-
loopbane gebruik maak. Dit word dus aanbeveel dat verdere navorsing gedoen word om
die probleem op te los voordat waarskynlikheidsvloei betroubaar in ’n lughawe omgewing
geïmplementeer word.
iii
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank the Airbus Group and the South African National Aerospace Centre
for funding this research. I would also like to thank Sophie Lambeaux and Pierre Fabre
along with their colleagues at Airbus Toulouse for their technical guidance and feedback.
Much gratitude is also extended to the project supervisor, Thomas Jones, as well as Corné
van Daalen and Japie Engelbrecht for their valuable insight.
iv
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Contents
Declaration i
Abstract ii
Opsomming iii
Acknowledgements iv
Contents v
List of Figures viii
List of Tables x
Nomenclature xi
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Problem Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Purpose of Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.3 Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.4 Expected Results and Significance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.5 Thesis Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2 Literature Review 5
2.1 Phases of Commercial Flight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2 Safe Separation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3 Intent and Uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3.1 Trajectory Propagation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3.2 Sensors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3.3 Static Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.4 Collision Avoidance Systems in Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.4.1 Traffic Collision Avoidance System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.4.1.1 Mode S transponders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.4.1.2 Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.4.2 Ground Proximity Warning System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.4.3 Portable Collision Avoidance System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
v
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CONTENTS vi
2.4.4 Flight Alarms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.4.5 Air Traffic Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.4.6 Obstacle Collision Avoidance System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.4.7 Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.5 The Future of Air Traffic Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.5.1 Single European Sky ATM Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.5.2 Next Generation Air Transportation System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.6 Existing Probabilistic Conflict Detection Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.6.1 Monte Carlo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.6.2 Yang and Kuchar (Geometric Monte Carlo) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.6.3 Wangermann and Stengel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.6.4 Jones (PDF Propagation) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.6.5 Van Daalen (Probability Flow) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.7 Case Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.7.1 Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.7.1.1 Poor Visibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.7.1.2 Short Landing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.7.1.3 Instrument Malfunction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.7.2 Uncontrolled Flight into Terrain (UFIT) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.7.3 Mid-air Collision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.7.4 Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3 Modelling 32
3.1 Proposed Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.2 Conflict Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.3 Terrain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.4 Minkowski Addition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.5 Generic Aircraft Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.5.1 Principal Axis System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.5.2 Inertial Axis System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.5.3 Conversion between Axis Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.5.4 Basic Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4 Implementation 45
4.1 Software Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
4.2 Environment Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.3 Aircraft Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.3.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.3.2 Disturbance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.3.3 Cross-track Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CONTENTS vii
4.3.4 Altitude Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.4 Monte Carlo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.4.1 Initialisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.4.2 Calculating Mesh Intersections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.4.3 Memory Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.5 Probability Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4.5.1 Definition of a Tight Upper Bound . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4.5.2 Summary of Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.5.3 Adaptive Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.5.4 Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.6 Accumulating Risk for Multiple Conflicts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
5 Simulations and Results 70
5.1 Scenario 1: Two-Aeroplane Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
5.2 Scenario 2: Terrain Only . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5.2.1 Flow Perpendicular to Obstacles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
5.2.2 Flow Parallel to Obstacles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
5.3 Scenario 3: Multiple Intruders and Terrain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
5.4 Scenario 4: Aborted Landing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
6 Conclusion 93
6.1 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
6.2 Probability Flow Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
6.3 Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
Bibliography 100
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
List of Figures
2.1 The 7 stages of a commercial flight profile adapted from NASA [1] . . . . . . . 5
2.2 Wingtip Vortices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3 Methods of Trajectory Propagation [2] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.4 Example of TCAS separation regions between 5000 and 10,000 feet [3] . . . . 16
2.5 ADS-B Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.6 PDF Propagation and Distortion Process [4] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.1 High-Level Conflict Avoidance Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.2 Cylindrical and Spherical Conflict Region Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.3 Polygon Mesh Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.4 Minkowski Addition of the Host Aircraft with an Intruder Aircraft . . . . . . . 39
3.5 Small-Scale Minkowski Addition Example of Sphere with Terrain . . . . . . . . 40
3.6 Aircraft Principal Axis System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.7 NED Axis System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.8 Euler Angles of Attitude . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.9 Basic Aircraft Model by Peddle [5] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.1 Non-Linear Closed-Loop Aircraft Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.2 Inputs and Outputs of the Dryden Wind Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.3 Graphs showing Cross-track Position and Altitude with Disturbance over 5
Minutes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.4 Deviation Caused by a Wind Gust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.5 Aircraft Cross-track Variability over Time without Cross-track Controller . . . 52
4.6 Cross-track Controller using Yaw Angle Hold Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.7 Guidance Axis System adapted from [5] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.8 The Effect of Cross-Track Control on Aircraft Position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.9 Altitude Controller using Flightpath Angle Hold Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.10 Guidance Axis System showing Vertical Plane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.11 The Effect of Altitude Control on Aircraft Position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.12 Diagram illustrating the Midpoint Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.13 Diagram illustrating Simpson’s Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.14 Venn Diagrams for Illustration of the Inclusion-Exclusion Principle . . . . . . . 68
5.1 Two-Aeroplane Example Conceptual Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
viii
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
LIST OF FIGURES ix
5.2 Monte Carlo Simulation of Two-Aeroplane Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
5.3 Scenario 1: Top-View of Relative Monte Carlo Trajectories . . . . . . . . . . . 72
5.4 Scenario 1: Effect of Sampling Period on Execution Time and Probability of
Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
5.5 Scenario 1: Accumulation of Risk over Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
5.6 Scenario 1: Convergence of PC with increasing values of NMC . . . . . . . . . . 74
5.7 Terrain Maps of Paro, Bhutan Airport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5.8 Scenario 2: Mesh Reduction to Decrease Computation Time . . . . . . . . . . . 76
5.9 Scenario 2: Effect of Integration Error Thresholds on Execution Time and
Uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
5.10 Scenario 2: Effect of Mesh Reduction on Execution Time, Uncertainty and PUBC 77
5.11 Scenario 2: Effect of Mesh Reduction on Surface Area and Maximum Triangle
Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
5.12 Scenario 2: Accumulation of Risk over Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
5.13 Tight Upper Bound for Perpendicular Probability Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
5.14 Overestimate for Parallel Probability Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
5.15 Terrain Maps of Margalla Hills, Islamabad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
5.16 Scenario 3: 3D-View of Terrain and Aircraft Trajectories . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
5.17 Scenario 3: Effect of Surface Integration Error Threshold on Execution Time
and Uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
5.18 Scenario 3: Effect of Mesh Reduction on Execution Time, Uncertainty and PUBC 85
5.19 Scenario 3: Effect of Mesh Reduction on Surface Area and Maximum Triangle
Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
5.20 Scenario 3: Accumulation of Risk over Time for Each Obstacle . . . . . . . . . 88
5.21 Terrain Maps of San Francisco International Airport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
5.22 Scenario 4: 3D of Terrain and Aircraft Trajectory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
5.23 Scenario 4: Effect of Surface Integration Error Threshold on Execution Time
and Uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
5.24 Scenario 4: Effect of Mesh Reduction on Execution Time, Uncertainty and PUBC 90
5.25 Scenario 4: Effect of Mesh Reduction on Surface Area and Maximum Triangle
Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
5.26 Scenario 4: Accumulation of Risk over Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
List of Tables
2.1 Aircraft Wake Vortex Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2 FAA Minimum Landing Radar Separation Criteria [6] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3 Controlled Airspace Classes [7] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.4 TCAS II Alarm Thresholds [8] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.5 Civil Aviation Mode S Uplink Formats [9] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.6 Civil Aviation Mode S Downlink Formats [9] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.1 Aircraft Principal Axis Symbol Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.2 Aircraft Inertial Axis Symbol Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.1 Memory Usage Requirements for 12,000 Monte Carlo Simulations with Ts =
0.01 and Tf = 60 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
5.1 Two-Aircraft Scenario Simulation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
5.2 Terrain Only Scenario Simulation Results (first iteration) . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
5.3 Terrain Only Scenario Simulation Results (second iteration) . . . . . . . . . . . 79
5.4 Perpendicular Conflict Simulation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
5.5 Parallel Conflict Simulation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
5.6 Multiple Intruders and Terrain Simulation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
5.7 Aborted Landing Simulation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
x
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Nomenclature
Abbreviations
ft Feet
GB Gigabytes
KB Kilobytes
km Kilometres
km/h Kilometres per hour
m Metres
m/s Metres per second
MB Megabytes
MHz Megahertz
NM Nautical miles
s Seconds
Acronyms
2D Two-dimensional
3D Three-dimensional
ACAS Airborne Collision Avoidance System
ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast
API Application Programmers Interface
ATC Air Traffic Control
ATCO Air Traffic Control Officer
ATM Air Traffic Management
ATMS Air Traffic Management System
xi
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
LIST OF TABLES xii
AUV Autonomous Underwater Vehicle
CFIT Controlled Flight Into Terrain
Comm. Communications
CPA Closest Point of Approach
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FL Flight Level
FLARM Flight Alarm
GCC GNU Compiler Collection
GIS Geographic Information System
GPS Global Positioning System
GPWS Ground Proximity Warning System
HTTP Hyper-Text Transfer Protocol
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation
IFR Instrument Flight Rules
IMU Inertial Measurement Unit
JSON JavaScript Object Notation
MSL Mean Sea Level
MTOM Maximum Take-Off Mass
NED North-East-Down axis system
NextGen Next Generation Air Transportation System
NTSB National Transportation and Safety Board
OCAS Obstacle Collision Avoidance System
PAPI Precision Approach Path Indicator
PCAS Portable Collision Avoidance System
PDF Probability Density Function
RA Resolution Advisory
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
LIST OF TABLES xiii
RAM Random Access Memory
RVSM Reduced Vertical Separation Minima
SESAR Single European Sky ATM Research
TA Traffic Advisory
TAWS Terrain Awareness Warning System
TCAS Traffic Collision Avoidance System
TCP Trajectory Change Point
UAT Universal Access Transceiver
UFIT Uncontrolled Flight Into Terrain
URL Uniform Resource Locator
US United States (of America)
VRF Visual Flight Rules
XML Extensible Mark-up Language
Symbol Conventions
x Scalar
x Vector
x(t) Time-varying vector
X Set
X Matrix
X(t) Time-varying matrix
X(t, ω) Vector of random processes
x Mean of x
List of Symbols
α Angle of attack
α/2 Critical value
β Angle of sideslip
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
LIST OF TABLES xiv
∆M Distance between 2 points on a sphere
λ Coordinate of longitude
nf Normal vector to a triangular mesh face
np Normal vector at vertex of mesh
pnew New point in terrain mesh after Minkowski sum
pold Old point in original terrain mesh before Minkowski sum
p Position vector of a point in space
rh A host aircraft position vector
ri An intruder aircraft position vector
v A triangle vertex.
Φ,Θ,Ψ Roll, pitch and yaw angles respectively
ψtrack Heading of the flight route (ground track)
σMC Standard deviation of Monte Carlo generated trajectories
σPC(MC) Standard deviation of the Monte Carlo probability of conflict
θtrack Flight path angle of flight route
ϕ Coordinate of latitude
Cm Centre of mass
Em Error margin
gd Difference in altitude between source waypoint and aircraft
hd Distance in NE-plane from source waypoint to aircraft
Kψ Cross-track controller gain
Kθ Altitude controller gain
L,M,N Roll, pitch and yaw moments respectively
Ltrack Distance from source waypoint to destination waypoint
NGMC Number of Geometric Monte Carlo simulations or trajectories
NMC Number of Monte Carlo simulations or trajectories
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
LIST OF TABLES xv
NF Number of mesh faces
NO Number of detected threats near host aircraft
NR Number of Google Elevation API requests
NS The number of samples along a simulated path i.e. TfTs
NV Number of mesh vertices
P,Q,R Roll, pitch and yaw rates (angular velocity) respectively
PC True probability of conflict
PCT Net probability of conflict over a specified future time interval
rE Radius of the Earth
Rh Set of host aircraft position vectors
Ri Set of intruder aircraft position vectors
sI Function parameter value at which an intersection occurs
Tf Total simulation time
Ts Simulation sampling period
U, V,W Linear velocity vector coordinates in the XP , YP and ZP axes respectively
WTD Turbulence in the Down inertial axis
WTE Turbulence in the East inertial axis
WTN Turbulence in the North inertial axis
WTP Turbulence in the lateral principal axis
X,Y, Z Force vector coordinates in the XP , YP and ZP axes respectively
xd Along-track distance travelled
XP Longitudinal (roll) axis in the principal axis system
XP Normal (yaw) axis in the principal axis system
yd Cross-track error
YP Lateral (pitch) axis in the principal axis system
zd Altitude error
zα/2 Z-score of Gaussian distribution at critical value α/2
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In this chapter, the topic of research is introduced through a discussion of the problem,
the purpose of the research and the project objectives. A summary follows of the overall
thesis navigation and structure.
1.1 Problem Description
Commercial airspace is becoming increasingly cluttered and more complex for pilots to
navigate safely. This is primarily due to a rising demand for public air transport and a
more densely populated terrain. Aircraft manufacturers are producing larger aircraft and
airlines are acquiring more aircraft to improve transport capacity.
The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) requires that aircraft maintain a
safe separation distance between themselves and obstacles. A violation of this criteria
is called a conflict. If a conflict occurs, a collision is considered to be imminent. It is
becoming increasingly difficult to avoid conflict between aircraft, especially near airports
where air traffic is most concentrated, terrain is most cluttered and flight paths are most
limited.
As a possible solution, aviation authorities have proposed that free flight be implemented
in next generation air traffic management (ATM) systems such as SESAR and NextGen
(discussed in section 2.5 on page 21). Free flight is a navigational concept in which aircraft
operate independently of any centralised traffic control. Aircraft are able to plan and re-
route paths dynamically while maintaining safe separation criteria automatically. Research
efforts in the field of automatic conflict detection and resolution are therefore important
if free flight objectives are to be achieved.
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1.2 Purpose of Work
Automatic conflict resolution is a very desirable feature for commercial aircraft because it
has the potential to avoid collisions where pilots may fail to do so. However, this shifts
some responsibility from pilots to aircraft manufacturers. Resolution decisions are based
on the accurate detection of a conflict in the future. Manufacturers therefore need to have
high confidence in the prediction result before automatic resolution can be implemented.
A large amount of work has been done on conflict detection for the en-route phase of
commercial flight [10], but little has been done for the phases of flight in close proximity
to an airport. Furthermore, collision avoidance systems currently used in practice are not
fully equipped to handle the level of uncertainty present in the prediction of future aircraft
trajectories. This thesis therefore focuses exclusively on probabilistic conflict detection
for commercial aircraft near the airport environment. Although this approach considers
piloted flight, it is important to note that the methods and concepts discussed in this
thesis are also applicable to autonomous vehicles.
1.3 Objectives
The research objectives for this project are as follows:
1. Develop an understanding of current air traffic management systems and collision
avoidance systems in practice;
2. Investigate existing methods of probabilistic conflict detection;
3. Model the relevant aspects of the airport environment;
4. Develop a collision avoidance framework incorporating conflict detection;
5. Implement the chosen probabilistic conflict detection method in various, realistic,
simulated flight scenarios;
6. Evaluate the performance and suitability of the chosen method in the civil aviation
context;
7. Make recommendations for improvement.
1.4 Expected Results and Significance
The primary contribution of this thesis lies in the evaluation of the probability flow al-
gorithm for probabilistic conflict detection in a civil aviation context. The algorithm
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should be tested for uncertain, cluttered environments, particularly near airports where
multiple moving obstacles and dangerous terrain are frequent.
Van Daalen shows that the algorithm is capable of performing real-time conflict predic-
tion in relatively simple scenarios. This thesis attempts to discover the limitations of the
algorithm in terms of execution time and accuracy for larger expanses of terrain and mul-
tiple dynamic intruders.
Simulation results are expected to reveal algorithm trade-off between accuracy and effi-
ciency. However, it is predicted that a tractable improvement can be offered on existing
collision avoidance systems. To the author’s knowledge, this thesis presents the first ap-
plication and testing of the probability flow method in the civil aviation context and more
specifically, at an airport.
1.5 Thesis Overview
In chapter 1, the topic of research is introduced and a general problem description is
provided. The purpose of this project, scope and expected significance are also discussed
before the chapter is concluded with an overview of the thesis.
Chapter 2 presents a review of recent literature relevant to collision avoidance. The fun-
damentals of commercial flight are presented along with a discussion of regulated safe
separation requirements for civilian aircraft. This chapter investigates sources of uncer-
tainty and intent in the airport environment and describes the operation of various existing
collision avoidance systems in practice. Furthermore, the goals of future air traffic man-
agement systems in Europe and the USA are examined to provide motive and context for
how this research may contribute to the development of anticipated aviation technology.
Previous methods of probabilistic conflict detection are then presented before the chapter
is concluded with a number of collision case studies, assisting the choice of test simulation
scenarios used later in chapter 5.
Modelling concepts important to the accurate portrayal of the environment in simulation
are outlined in chapter 3. A collision avoidance framework is proposed preceding the dis-
cussion of specific terrain and aircraft modelling techniques. The reference systems and
basic notation used in the aircraft model are also defined.
In chapter 4, the implementation of the Monte Carlo and probability flow methods is
described. A brief overview of the testing software is given as well as a detailed account
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of how disturbance is introduced into the simulation to mimic uncertainty and control
systems are employed to imitate a pilot’s influence on the aircraft. The implementation
of the Monte Carlo method is presented along with a description of the practical con-
siderations that were required when memory exhaustive data generation was performed.
The mathematical definition of probability flow is subsequently provided accompanied by
a discussion of numerical methods used to efficiently solve the complex integrals present
in the definition. The chapter is rounded off with a proposed formulation for calculating
the net probability of conflict for multiple conflict events.
The penultimate chapter, chapter 5, presents the results of 4 simulation scenarios key to
evaluating the performance of Van Daalen’s probability flow method. Observations are
made regarding accuracy relative to the Monte Carlo generated probability of conflict as
well as the uncertainty in prediction. Various characteristics of the algorithm are noted
through the examination of the simulation results.
Chapter 6 concludes this thesis by providing an overview of the achieved research object-
ives, a summary of the simulation results and a review of the discovered limitations and
performance factors relevant to the probability flow method. Lastly, recommendations are
made for future improvement of the algorithm with regards to efficiency and minimisation
of uncertainty.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
This chapter introduces important collision avoidance concepts that promote contextual
understanding of the research objectives. An overview of conflict avoidance systems cur-
rently in practice is provided as well as a discussion on existing methods of probabilistic
conflict detection.
2.1 Phases of Commercial Flight
During a single flight, a commercial aircraft typically moves through 7 different phases
(see figure 2.1) that are collectively called a flight profile.
Preflight
Takeoff
Departure
En Route
Descent
Approach
Landing
Figure 2.1: The 7 stages of a commercial flight profile adapted from NASA [1]
In this thesis, emphasis is placed on the first and last three phases of the flight profile, which
are nearest the airport environment. In all cases, the aircraft under consideration is referred
to as the host aircraft. Other aircraft and moving ground vehicles that may pose a threat
to the host aircraft are referred to as intruders. Intruder aircraft and weather collectively
form the dynamic environment while the static environment describes stationary obstacles
such as terrain and protected airspace.
2.2 Safe Separation
In order to maintain safe flight, ICAO requires that minimum separation criteria be en-
forced between aircraft and obstacles. The protected airspace surrounding an aircraft is
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referred to as the conflict region. A conflict therefore exists if any object violates the safe
separation criteria. This is not to be confused with a collision, which occurs only if there
is a physical impact between an aircraft and an obstacle.
Wake vortex turbulence is a contributing factor in the calculation of safe separation stand-
ards. It is made up of wing-tip vortices and jet-wash. Jet-wash is fast-moving gas expelled
from an aircraft’s engine, which causes short bursts of turbulence. Wing-tip vortices are
more dangerous because they can remain in the air for up to 3 minutes after an aircraft
has passed. When an aircraft’s wing is experiencing lift, air from below the wing is forced
around to the top of the wing where there is lower air pressure (see figure 2.2).
Figure 2.2: Wingtip Vortices
The effect of wake vortex turbulence is dependent on the weight and size of the aircraft.
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) of the US and ICAO therefore categorise
aircraft into different classes (see table 2.1).
Table 2.1: Aircraft Wake Vortex Classification
ICAO[11] MTOM∗
Light ≤ 7000 kg
Medium 7000 kg < MTOM < 136,000 kg
Heavy ≥ 136,000 kg
FAA[12] MTOM
Small ≤ 19,000 kg
Large 19,000 kg < MTOM < 140,000 kg
Heavy ≥ 140,000 kg
Super Airbus A380 Only
∗ Maximum Take Off Mass
ICAO specifies different separation standards for each phase of commercial flight operating
under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR). IFR require that the pilot navigate solely on the
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basis of outputs from on-board instruments, especially in situations when weather may
compromise visual awareness. Alternatively, pilots can fly using Visual Flight Rules (VFR)
depending on the regulations of the country or airport airspace in which they are flying.
VFR allow the pilot to navigate the aircraft by sight in conditions of good visibility. This
relies on the pilot’s ability to avoid obstacles by visual acquisition. Separation criteria for
VFR are usually given by Air Traffic Control (ATC) or pilots are expected to maintain
separation at their own discretion. IFR is used more often than VFR for commercial
flights because routes frequently occupy clouded altitudes.
The following IFR separation rules are described by ICAO [11]:
En-route (Cruise)
• Vertical separation is 1000 ft (300 m) below an altitude of 29,000 ft (FL290)
and 2000 ft (600 m) at or above FL290.
• Aircraft equipped with more advanced instruments may be allowed to follow
Reduced Vertical Separation Minima (RVSM), which allows a 1000 ft (300 m)
separation up to an altitude of 41,000 ft (FL410) and 2000 ft (600 m) between
FL410 and 60,000 ft (FL600).
• 5000 ft (1500 m) vertical separation is enforced between all aircraft above
FL600, regardless of RVSM.
• Aircraft following the same track require a longitudinal separation of 15 minutes
at all times. For an aircraft travelling at a typical cruise speed of 475-500 knots,
this equates to approximately 220-231 kilometres in longitudinal distance.
• Radar-controlled aircraft are required to be separated horizontally by at least
3 NM if within 40 NM of the radar antenna or by at least 5 NM if further than
40 NM from the antenna.
Departure and Descent
• An aircraft may immediately move to an altitude level previously occupied
by another aircraft provided that the latter has reported departing it, severe
turbulence is not present and minimum en-route vertical separation criteria are
not violated.
• For aircraft departing or descending on the same track, a minimum separation
of 5 minutes is required provided that the aircraft furthest from the airport is
travelling 37 km/h faster than the aircraft closest to the airport. A minimum
separation of only 3 minutes is required if the aircraft furthest from the airport
is travelling 74 km/h faster than the aircraft closest to the airport.
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• If two aircraft are departing on tracks that are at a 45 degree angle to one
another at the divergence point, a 1 minute separation is recommended.
• Aircraft departing or descending on crossing paths are recommended to main-
tain a 15 minute separation from the intersection point, but it may be reduced
to 10 minutes for aircraft equipped with modern navigation aids that permit
frequent determination of speed and position.
Preflight and Take Off
• An aircraft in a lower class must wait 2 minutes before taking off following an
aircraft of a higher class.
• A 3 minute waiting period is advised between aircraft taking off on parallel
runways separated by 760 m or less. On parallel runways separated by more
than 760 m, a 2 minute separation may be applied.
• Aircraft taking off from the same runway in opposite directions require a 2
minute separation.
Approach and Landing
• A minimum radar separation distance must be maintained between aircraft
of different classes when landing (see table 2.2). Radar separation is used to
regulate aircraft within 40 nautical miles (NM) of a radar antenna, usually at
an airport.
Table 2.2: FAA Minimum Landing Radar Separation Criteria [6]
Preceding Aircraft Following Aircraft Radar Separation (NM)
Super Super 2.5
Heavy 6
Large 7
Small 8
Heavy Heavy 4
Large 5
Small 6
Large Large 2.5
Small 4
Small Small 2.5
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There are also various regulations that govern specific regions of airspace. It is divided
into classes A-G where A-E denotes controlled airspace and F-G is uncontrolled airspace.
Controlled airspace is a predefined region in which air traffic control services are available.
The degree of control is dependent on the specific class of airspace (see table 2.3). Un-
controlled airspace refers to regions, which may be too remote or high in altitude for air
traffic control services to operate. Aircraft are independently responsible for their own air
traffic navigation in these regions.
Table 2.3: Controlled Airspace Classes [7]
Entry Requirement Navigation Region
A ATC clearance, IFR equipped IFR only 18,000 ft MSL∗ - FL600
B ATC clearance, Two-way radio,
Mode C/S transponder
IFR / VFR 10,000 ft MSL around a nation’s
busy airports
C Two-way radio, Mode C/S
transponder prior to entry
IFR / VFR 5 NM radius up to 1200 ft MSL
and 10 NM up to 4000 ft MSL
around airports with a radar
control tower
D Two-way radio prior to entry IFR / VFR 2500 ft MSL around airports
with a radar control tower
E None for VFR IFR / VFR 14,500 ft MSL up to 18,000 ft
MSL
∗ Mean Sea Level
2.3 Intent and Uncertainty
It is important to know where an aircraft is expected to be in the future if a conflict is
to be predicted. State variables contain information about the aircraft, such as position,
heading and speed. The prediction of future aircraft states is dependent on the current
states of the aircraft and the pilot’s ability to follow a pre-determined flight route. A
planned flight route forms part of the aircraft’s intent, where intent refers to the planned
states of the aircraft for a specific time interval in the future with particular interest in its
position [13].
Regardless of whether or not the aircraft follows the planned flight route, a path that the
aircraft is expected to follow in the future is known as a predicted trajectory. Knowledge
about intended changes in future states improves the accuracy of a predicted trajectory.
It is impossible to know what the exact intentions of the pilot are. It is therefore assumed
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that the pilot follows the intended flight route within an envelope of uncertainty. It is
possible that in the future, the pilot’s intentions may be modelled to obtain a more ac-
curate representation of the predicted trajectory, but this will require separate research
and study in the area of predicting human behaviour. An aircraft under autopilot control
behaves much like an ideal pilot, following the intended flight route, being only influenced
by environmental factors such as wind, pressure, temperature and turbulence for example.
In this thesis, the aircraft is therefore flown in simulation under autopilot control in con-
junction with a turbulence model to imitate realistic conditions of uncertainty.
Uncertainty is not only present in the predicted trajectory of an aircraft, but also in the
estimation of the current aircraft states as well as in maps of the terrain. State estimation
uncertainty is primarily due to inaccuracies in on-board sensors or modelling errors in the
dynamics of the aircraft. Errors in terrain maps exist because not every point of elevation
on the Earth has been measured. Discrete terrain data is interpolated and further sim-
plified depending on the format in which it is being stored. Moreover, uncertainty is also
present in a system’s knowledge of other aircraft states.
Reducing system uncertainty enables the avoidance system to be more confident in its pre-
diction of conflict. Uncertainty can never be eliminated entirely and so, it should rather
be incorporated into a conflict detection system than ignored. Uncertainty must therefore
be modelled mathematically.
Paielli and Erzberger [14] chose to model uncertainties as Gaussian random variables for
the along-track and cross-track errors. They managed to successfully obtain a closed-
form analytical solution for a two-aircraft conflict scenario. Yang and Kuchar [2] further
motivated this choice because it simplifies the problem considerably, but also argued that
as the number and complexity of uncertainties increases in a trajectory model, it becomes
difficult to obtain an accurate solution.
2.3.1 Trajectory Propagation
According to Yang and Kuchar [2], an aircraft’s predicted trajectory can be obtained
through three different propagation methods: nominal, worst-case and probabilistic. The
nominal approach assumes that the aircraft trajectory follows a singular path. This is
usually implemented by assuming that the aircraft flies in a straight line in the direction
of the current velocity vector. This method is very simple, but does not incorporate any
uncertainty. Kuchar and Yang also suggested that the nominal approach is not suitable
because accurate predictions can only be calculated a few seconds into the future [10].
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This is not appropriate for scenarios where aircraft are in the en-route phase of flight
travelling at high speeds over a long distance. However, this could be sufficient for an
airport scenario where conflict will be predicted only a few seconds in the future, but it is
possible that missed detections will still be prevalent.
Host
“Miss”
“Hit”
(a) Nominal
Host
“Miss”
“Hit”
Flyable Envelope
(b) Worst-case
Host
0
0.5 0.35
0.05
0.1
(c) Probabilistic
Figure 2.3: Methods of Trajectory Propagation [2]
Alternatively, an extension of nominal trajectory propagation called waypoint navigation
can be used to predict the aircraft trajectory. Waypoints represent an ordered sequence
of GPS coordinates along a proposed flight route. With waypoint navigation, it could be
assumed that the aircraft is flying along straight-line segments between waypoints. It is
then easy to predict the trajectory of the aircraft if it is known that it will pass through
certain GPS coordinates. The disadvantage of this method is that the aircraft might not
necessarily be flying perfectly in a straight line between waypoints due to wind and sensor
inaccuracies, and pilots may deviate from their routes in the event of bad weather, emer-
gency or malfunction.
To improve the waypoint navigation method, Yang et al. [2] developed a trajectory predic-
tion model that specifies an expected time of arrival (ETA) at each waypoint. Additionally,
the number of waypoints can be reduced to include only trajectory change points (TCPs),
locations at which significant changes occur in the aircraft’s states. This simplification was
also used by Poretta et al. [15]. These TCPs mostly lie on points where heading changes
are necessary or at the boundary between phases of flight (see figure 2.1 on page 5) where
altitude changes occur. The TCPs are then ordered in terms of their associated ETA.
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The worst-case method considers all possible paths that an aircraft is able to follow in
a future time-interval. The possible paths are only limited by the physical capabilities
of the aircraft. The nominal and worst-case propagation methods both return a binary
result of true or false when checking for a conflict. This is a disadvantage for the worst-
case method because highly improbable paths may cause a conflict to be detected. The
worst-case method therefore results in many false alerts.
The probabilistic method models aircraft state information using random variables. Pos-
sible trajectories are weighted by their likelihood of occurrence. The aircraft’s position,
heading and velocity can for instance be modelled by their probability distributions. The
probabilistic approach is taken in this thesis because it allows uncertainty to be incorpor-
ated into the trajectory propagation model and it offers the best trade-off between missed
detections and false alerts.
2.3.2 Sensors
The first step in trajectory prediction is to determine the current states of the aircraft,
such as speed, heading and position. This information can be derived from sensors and
instruments on-board the aircraft.
The primary hardware responsible for determining aircraft state information is the Iner-
tial Measurement Unit (IMU). The IMU consists of accelerometers and rate gyroscopes.
There are usually three accelerometers in an IMU, which can measure acceleration of the
aircraft in three different axes. There are also three rate gyroscopes, which measure the
three-dimensional (3D) angular rates of the aircraft.
Unfortunately, the IMU can often accumulate errors because the navigation system con-
tinuously sums detected changes at each time instant with its previously measured values.
As a solution, other sensors external to the IMU are used to check for errors and correct
the measurements when necessary. In more sophisticated sensor installations, magneto-
meters are utilised to detect 3D magnetic field strength. This magnetic field strength is
used to determine the heading of the aircraft.
A Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver is used on most modern civilian aircraft for
its ability to accurately determine an aircraft’s position in time as well as nearby weather
information. GPS consists of multiple satellites orbiting the Earth and an aircraft must
have an unobstructed line of sight to at least 4 satellites to receive GPS information.
Radar is used to calculate the angle and range between an aircraft and its surroundings.
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It achieves this by bouncing radio waves off objects in the environment and measuring the
time it takes to receive the signal again. In this manner, the bearing and position of the
aircraft in the inertial reference frame can be obtained.
A pitot tube is an instrument that can measure aircraft velocity (airspeed) and resides
on the fuselage or wing of the aircraft. These three devices are used together with the
IMU to determine the current states of the aircraft at every time instant during flight.
Unfortunately, one can never be entirely certain about the integrity of state information,
which is why it can be referred to as a state estimate.
2.3.3 Static Environment
In order to predict conflict with the terrain, precise information on the location and eleva-
tion of mountains, buildings, protected airspace and other stationary hazards is required.
Currently, the best solution is to use a Geographical Information System (GIS), which
includes a database containing geographical maps for regions worldwide. By 2012, ICAO
had accumulated GIS maps for over 4 300 cities, 43 875 routes and 31 096 200 movements
[16]. The system is still consistently expanding today.
In this thesis, the assumption is made that the host aircraft will always have access to a
GIS map for the geographical regions encapsulating the intended flight path. Furthermore,
we assume that the aircraft is equipped with radar, which assists in the identification of
the aircraft’s surroundings. The host aircraft is therefore considered to have full knowledge
of the static environment.
2.4 Collision Avoidance Systems in Practice
Various collision avoidance systems are currently in operation on the ground and in the
air on-board aircraft. An Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) operates inde-
pendently of ground-based equipment and other aircraft. Its only concern is for the safety
of the aircraft upon which it operates. If a threat is evident, the system provides the
pilot with visual and aural warnings. If a collision is considered imminent, the system also
advises the pilot on a manoeuvre to avoid the collision.
ACAS relies on information from on-board sensors and instruments to predict future col-
lisions. Examples of ACAS are the Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS), Ground
Proximity Warning System (GPWS), Portable Collision Avoidance System (PCAS) and
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Flight Alarm (FLARM) devices.
Ground-based systems such as Air Traffic Control (ATC) and the Obstacle Collision Avoid-
ance System (OCAS) mostly rely on radar and Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broad-
cast (ADS-B) interrogations to determine the location and trajectory of aircraft relative to
obstacles. Advisories about possible threats of collision are communicated to pilots from
the ground via radio or ADS-B. ACAS warnings are prioritised above those received from
ground-based systems.
2.4.1 Traffic Collision Avoidance System
A mid-air collision between two airliners that occurred over the Grand Canyon in 1956
first revealed the need to civil aviation authorities for an effective collision avoidance sys-
tem. Early developments identified that the solution should be cooperative and capable of
issuing complementary and non-conflicting manoeuvre commands to all pilots involved in
a close encounter. However, this requires a reliable communication link between aircraft.
[8]
Design attempts by various airlines and manufacturers throughout the 1970s led to the
first use of transponders as a means for aircraft to determine an intruder’s range and
altitude. A Mode A transponder is capable of responding to interrogations with a 4-digit
Octal identifying (“squawk”) code, but a Mode C transponder can additionally transmit
aircraft pressure altitude in 100 ft increments measured from an on-board barometer. Only
4,096 identity codes exist in Mode A and C making it difficult to keep identity assignments
unique in crowded airspace. The squawk code of the aircraft is manually set by the pilot
in the cockpit, but only at the request of an air traffic control officer (ATCO).
At first, the accuracy and reliability of transponders was poor due to a cluttered radio
frequency band and a limited number of squawk codes, especially for high traffic areas.
Many false alarms resulted in the testing of initial systems. Another mid-air collision that
occurred in 1978 above San Diego spurred the FAA to concentrate efforts on developing
the first widely used avoidance system for commercial aircraft, TCAS. [8]
TCAS I is the first and most basic form of ACAS. It monitors surrounding air traffic and
issues a “traffic, traffic” warning to the pilot if an intruder is nearby. TCAS I does not
offer a solution to resolve the threat and only assists the pilot in the visual acquisition of
other aircraft. Once a threat is no longer imminent, TCAS I issues a “clear of conflict”
alert. TCAS warnings and alerts are called traffic advisories (TAs). TCAS II, TCAS I’s
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Table 2.4: TCAS II Alarm Thresholds [8]
Host Aircraft Altitude (feet) Time to Collision (seconds)
TA RA
< 1000 20 N/A
1000 - 2350 25 15
2350 - 5000 30 20
5000 - 10,000 40 25
10,000 - 20,000 45 30
> 20,000 48 35
successor, offers the added functionality of issuing vertical resolution advisories (RAs) to
the pilot. An RA is a recommended exit manoeuvre to either maintain or increase vertical
separation between aircraft. Both aircraft involved in a conflict are given complementary
RAs to avoid aggravation of the situation. [8]
TCAS II was designed to cope with a traffic density of 24 aircraft within a 5 nautical mile
radius, which is the maximum envisioned by the FAA for the next 20 years. Each conflict
situation is considered one at a time and is prioritised based on time to the closest point of
approach (CPA). The alarm time thresholds for TCAS II vary by altitude and are listed
in table 2.4. An example of the TCAS separation regions is provided in figure 2.4 on the
following page for the 5000 to 10,000 ft case.
2.4.1.1 Mode S transponders
By 1981 when TCAS I was starting to be implemented, Mode S (Select) transponders
had been created. Mode S transponders are more advanced than their predecessors in
that they use discrete address communication techniques, which permit more dependable
coordinated escape manoeuvres between aircraft. [8]
Every aircraft is assigned a unique 24-bit address by ICAO, which is used to identify
a particular aircraft when interrogated. The address consists of a header block, which
identifies the country of origin, and the number of remaining bits determines how many
allocations can be made in that country. For example, the UK has a 6-bit header block,
which leaves 18 address bits corresponding to 218 (262,144) registered aircraft. Austria has
a 9-bit header block, meaning they can only have 32,768 codes to allocate. The number of
allocations per country is regulated by ICAO based on the size of the country and amount
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Intruder TA Region RA Region
Host
2.1 NM - 20 s
3.5 NM - 40 s
20 NM
300 kt closure rate
Figure 2.4: Example of TCAS separation regions between 5000 and 10,000 feet [3]
of air traffic in the region. [17]
Each time a transponder is interrogated, an aircraft replies with a message that consists
of an 8 µs preamble (“handshake”) followed by a data block. A short data block is made
up of a 5-bit format identifier, a surveillance and control word of 27-bits and the 24-bit
ICAO address. Each data bit takes 1 µs to transmit. A longer data block can also include
an additional message field of 56-bits or an extended message field of 80-bits, depending
on the format identifier. [18]
The format identifier can be one of 25 different downlink or uplink modes signifying the
type of message content being transmitted. In civil aviation, only the formats in table 2.5
and 2.6 are used.
2.4.1.2 Limitations
TCAS II operates under the following constraints [19]:
1. TCAS cannot detect aircraft that are not equipped with an operational transponder.
2. The full range of coordinated RAs can only be exchanged between aircraft both
equipped with Mode S. RAs cannot be issued for aircraft without an altitude report-
ing transponder (Mode A).
3. Only vertical resolution manoeuvres can be issued. Some situations may exist where
horizontal RAs are more favourable.
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Table 2.5: Civil Aviation Mode S Uplink Formats [9]
Format Identifier Message Content
UF0 Short air-to-air ACAS
UF4 Surveillance altitude request
UF5 Surveillance identity request
UF11 Mode S only all-call
UF16 Long air-to-air ACAS
UF20 Comm. B altitude request
UF21 Comm. B identity request
UF24 Comm. C extended length message (ELM)
Table 2.6: Civil Aviation Mode S Downlink Formats [9]
Format Identifier Message Content
DF0 Short air-to-air ACAS
DF4 Surveillance altitude reply
DF5 Surveillance identity reply
DF11 All-call reply
DF16 Long air-to-air ACAS
DF20 Comm. B altitude reply
DF21 Comm. B identity reply
DF24 Comm. D extended length message (ELM)
4. Advisories are not issued against aircraft travelling at excessive vertical rates (>
10,000 feet per minute).
5. TCAS will automatically fail if input is lost or disabled from on-board instruments
such as the radio altimeter, barometric altimeter, transponder or inertial navigation
system.
6. All RAs are inhibited below 1000 ft above ground level. “Descend” RAs are inhibited
below 1100 ft and “Increase Descend” RAs are inhibited below 1450 ft. “Climb” and
“Increase Climb” RAs can also be inhibited above certain altitudes, but this is only
set when TCAS is installed or updated.
7. Due to interference, TCAS may not be able to display all transponder equipped
aircraft in heavy traffic environments.
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8. Terrain proximity warnings take precedence over TCAS warnings.
2.4.2 Ground Proximity Warning System
The GPWS is a mechanism that helps pilots to avoid collisions with terrain. It relies on
the use of a radar altimeter to determine the aircraft’s height above the ground. The
system monitors trends in the terrain and warns the pilot if the aircraft is in danger of
an imminent collision. Warnings include those against excessive descent rate, steep bank
angle, low terrain clearance and wind shear. GPWS warnings take precedence over TCAS
warnings.
A shortcoming of the GPWS is that it only detects changes in terrain directly underneath
the aircraft. The GPWS could fail to predict a sudden change in terrain such as a cliff or
tall building. Improvements were therefore made to form the Enhanced Ground Proximity
Warning System (EGPWS). The new system has access to GIS maps and GPS satellites
to help determine where an aircraft is flying relative to dangerous terrain.
Another flaw in the original GPWS is the lack of warning in short landing scenarios. The
GPWS would recognise that landing gear has been deployed and would go into standby
mode, ignoring any imminent collision with the ground. The EGPWS is linked to a
database of the world’s airports containing the exact location and descent profile of each
runway. Using this information, it is able to warn the pilot if the aircraft is descending
prematurely relative to the runway descent profile.
A term commonly used when referring to terrain avoidance is the Terrain Awareness and
Warning Systems (TAWS). The FAA created this term to encompass all past, present and
future systems that adhere to terrain avoidance objectives. The GPWS and EGPWS can
therefore both be classified as TAWS.
2.4.3 Portable Collision Avoidance System
PCAS was created by Zaon Flight Systems Incorporated for light and small private aircraft
operating under VFR. The system is more simplistic and passive than TCAS, but offers
similar features in that it detects the range and altitude of nearby transponder-equipped
aircraft. PCAS also has the ability to alert the pilot if an intruder is getting closer or
further away. More modern versions of PCAS are paired with GPS to provide a visual
display of intruder locations. [20]
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The primary difference between TCAS and PCAS is that reaction to TCAS advisories is
mandatory whereas PCAS warnings serve merely as a suggestion. PCAS also does not
require special installation like TCAS and it is also less expensive. PCAS is typically
equipped on aircraft using Mode A or C transponders.
2.4.4 Flight Alarms
FLARMS are small electronic devices designed to be used for collision avoidance between
short-range glider aircraft. FLARMs use GPS and a barometric sensor to determine
position. This information, along with a forecast of trajectory, is transmitted to other
FLARM devices within a 3-5 km radius. The system can predict up to 50 collisions at a
time and warns the pilot aurally. [21]
2.4.5 Air Traffic Control
ATC is a ground-based service that facilitates the flow of air traffic, provides informa-
tion to aircraft and primarily enforces traffic separation rules. At an airport, ATCOs are
situated in tall control towers where they have unrestricted visibility of airport airspace.
ATCOs also observe aircraft location, speed and trajectory information collected from air-
craft transponder interrogations and long range radar above the control tower. The ATCO
must use these observations to give clearance in a sequential manner that allows smooth
operation of all aircraft in this area without conflict. ATCOs communicate with the pilot
via radio or by using light signals.
ATCOs have varying responsibilities and operate in different sectors at an airport. The
region in which they operate around an airport is called the Terminal Control Area (TCA)
in the US or the Terminal Manoeuvring Area (TMA) in Europe. The TCA or TMA consist
of multiple cylindrical layers that get larger with altitude centred at the airport. ATCOs
responsible for managing ground, take-off and landing operations work in a 5 mile (8 km)
radius around the airport. Those responsible for coordinating approach, departure and
queueing operations are active in a 5 to 50 nautical mile (9 to 92 km) radius.
2.4.6 Obstacle Collision Avoidance System
OCAS is a ground-based system that is placed near obstacles such as power lines, telecom-
munications towers and wind turbines, which are a threat to low-flying aircraft. OCAS
uses low-power radar to detect the ground speed, heading and altitude of nearby aircraft
and calculates whether or not it is appropriately clear of the obstacle.
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OCAS is an obstacle-specific rule-based system. The first warning to a pilot is to turn
on bright flashing lights installed on the obstacle. A second, aural warning in the cockpit
is issued if the first warning is ignored. The warning is transmitted from OCAS to the
cockpit via radio. [21]
2.4.7 Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast
ADS-B is a modern, cooperative system that uses ground stations, GPS satellites and an
enhanced data-link to relay information in real-time between all parties involved in air
traffic management. In figure 2.5, the basic operation of ADS-B can be observed. Aircraft
obtain their position from GPS satellites and other information from sensors on-board.
They then simultaneously broadcast this information, along with their unique ICAO 24-
bit identification code, to other aircraft and ground stations. Ground stations can then
relay this information to ATC towers.
( (( (
GPS Satellite
Ground Station Air Traffic Control Tower
Aircraft t
o Aircraft
Figure 2.5: ADS-B Communication
ADS-B has the potential to replace or supplement radar-based surveillance systems. ADS-
B is much more accurate than radar and allows aircraft to obtain up-to-date information
about nearby vehicles or terrain that might pose a threat of collision [22]. The range
of ADS-B is approximately 270 to 320 kilometres from airborne component to airborne
component and 288 kilometres from airborne component to ground infrastructure [23].
ADS-B has two modes of operation: In and Out. Aircraft equipped with ADS-B In have
the ability to receive information directly from other aircraft as well as from ground sta-
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tions.
ADS-B Out allows an aircraft to broadcast the following data [22]:
• Horizontal position (latitude and longitude)
• Barometric altitude
• Aircraft identification (24-bit address and mode A code)
• Emergency Status
• Special Position Indicator (SPI) when selected
• Intent and weather information (depending on the transponder mode)
ADS-B Out requires that an aircraft be equipped with a Mode S transponder or Universal
Access Transceiver (UAT). Both data-links are bi-directional, but Mode S works at 1090
MHz and UAT works at 978 MHz. UAT has the advantage of extra available uplink band-
width, which means that additional weather information could also be communicated.
However, UAT requires a separate radio device, while Mode S is currently incorporated
into most already onboard aircraft transponders. UAT is also only presently used within
the US and Mode S is used everywhere else in the world [24].
It is noted that all aircraft do not have to be capable of ADS-B In for the system to work,
but only ADS-B Out. This is because all information broadcast by aircraft with ADS-B
Out is received by ground stations and relayed to ATC. The ATCOs can then use this
information to verbally communicate the location of surrounding aircraft to a particular
aircraft that is equipped only with ADS-B Out. ADS-B Out broadcasts information once
per second and therefore allows aircraft and ground stations with receivers to get an ac-
curate measure of the current states of all aircraft in a sample airspace [23].
ADS-B In, however, provides the advantage of being able to receive that information
directly and represent it on the cockpit display system with a GPS map. ADS-B In also
requires the addition of a Mode S receiver, which is not already included with the Mode S
transponder. However, TCAS also requires a Mode S receiver, so if an aircraft is equipped
with TCAS, it is also equipped with the Mode S receiver [24].
2.5 The Future of Air Traffic Management
There are currently two projects under development within Europe and the US to mod-
ernise air traffic management by 2025: SESAR and NextGen.
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2.5.1 Single European Sky ATM Research
The fragmentation of European airspace is estimated to cost e4 billion per year. This
fragmentation is due to inefficient routing of flights. In 2010, the average flight to or from
Europe travelled 49 km farther than its direct route. Furthermore, there is a concern for
congestion in airspace, which results in passenger delays, higher airline costs and more
Carbon emissions. In 2010 alone, 9.5 million flights were recorded. This is predicted to
increase to 17 million by 2030.
SESAR is a collaborative research effort with the overall goal of enhancing air traffic
management performance. The following are the key objectives of SESAR:
• Increase Europe’s airspace capacity by 27%
• Reduce accident risk by 40% per flight hour in anticipation of increasing traffic levels
• Reduce environmental impact by 2.8% per flight
• Reduce cost by 6% per flight
This thesis aims to contribute to the reduction of accident risk. It is therefore import-
ant that the specific requirements of SESAR collision avoidance can be met. These re-
quirements include the reduction of ATCO workload with increased automation of risk
management, the use of enhanced surveillance technology, the update of altitude capture
laws and the implementation of a short-range collision avoidance system specific to airport
environments.
2.5.2 Next Generation Air Transportation System
Like SESAR, the aim of NextGen is to enhance air traffic communications, optimise flight
routes, reduce Carbon emissions and improve safety. By 2018, NextGen is estimated to
reduce passenger delays by 35%, reduce Carbon emissions by 14 million tons and save
airlines $23 billion in fuel costs.
The focus of NextGen lies with the improvement of four major elements.
• Large-scale implementation of ADS-B technology will improve knowledge of aircraft
intent for both air traffic controllers and pilots. The FAA plans to mandate the
avionics required for ADS-B to function effectively.
• Current voice communication between aircrew and ground controllers will be sup-
plemented by a data communication link to provide better clarity.
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• The creation of a national weather information system will facilitate optimal routing
of flights and the reduction of delays due to weather.
• The restructure of the voice communications network will allow for the dynamic
reallocation of airspace and the optimisation of ATCO workload.
In terms of collision avoidance, NextGen aims to reduce the workload of ATCOs by auto-
mating more processes and increasing the responsibilities of airborne systems. Additional
collision avoidance performance targets are also being developed specific to airport envir-
onments.
2.6 Existing Probabilistic Conflict Detection Algorithms
Early attempts at conflict prediction were performed using Monte Carlo simulation. Yang
and Kuchar then improved upon the algorithm to create the Geometric Monte Carlo
method. Since then, various other methods have been developed. A novel method by
Van Daalen, called probability flow, is one of the most recent developments in conflict
prediction and is the focus of this thesis. A discussion of this method as well as those that
led to its development follow in this section.
2.6.1 Monte Carlo
Monte Carlo simulation is a method of estimating a result by sampling a known input set
from a probability distribution over the domain. The simulation is run over a period of
time to obtain as many samples as possible. The more random samples obtained from the
input set, the more accurate the estimation will be of a particular result.
In the case of determining the probability of conflict for a host aircraft, the sampling space
is the set of all possible aircraft locations in 3D Euclidean space. To reduce computational
complexity, static obstacles such as terrain and protected airspace are assumed to have
known locations and volumes. A probability density function (PDF) describing the un-
certainty of the initial aircraft states is sampled.
Each aircraft state will have a corresponding PDF with a mean determined from on-board
sensors and a standard deviation representing cross-track, along-track and altitude vari-
ability caused by disturbances. An aerodynamic model of the aircraft is then used to
forward simulate a random trajectory. Each simulation is initialised with a different ran-
dom sample from the PDF of the initial state vectors. The model takes the desired flight
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route and associated target states as input.
Each simulation results in a random trajectory. The set of all NMC random trajectories
represents all possible locations the aircraft could be within the look-ahead time. Each
random trajectory is checked for conflict and counted. The total number of detected
conflicts divided by the total number of simulations NMC is the probability of conflict.
It is therefore intuitive that as the number of simulations tends to infinity, we obtain a
ground-truth accuracy on the probability of conflict. Performing an adequate number of
simulations to be confident in the prediction result is very time consuming, depending
on the complexity of the aircraft model. Accuracy is also dependent on how realistically
we are able to model the aircraft. The Monte Carlo method therefore offers a trade-off
between accuracy and efficiency.
In an airport environment where obstacles are constantly moving, obstacle motion also
needs to be modelled and simulated using the Monte Carlo method. The number of
aircraft that exist in the sample space is a linear scaling factor to the number of simulations
required, which is proportional to the computation time. This is the largest disadvantage
of the Monte Carlo method. It is therefore unrealistic to use this method for real-time
conflict detection on-board aircraft. Another disadvantage of the Monte Carlo method is
that if NMC is not sufficiently large, the error relative to small calculated probabilities is
very high. The relationship between the trajectory (aircraft position) standard deviation
σMC and number of simulations NMC is
σMC =
1
2
√
NMC
where σMC is inversely proportional to NMC [2]. (2.6.1)
If we obtain a small probability of conflict, but NMC is small, we get large uncertainty on
a small result. We estimate the standard deviation on the probability of conflict PC using
equation 2.6.2.
σPC(MC) =
√
1
NMC
PC(1− PC) (2.6.2)
Monte Carlo simulation is a valuable benchmark of accuracy for other approaches when
simulated with many samples over a long period of time.
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2.6.2 Yang and Kuchar (Geometric Monte Carlo)
In 1998, Yang and Kuchar developed a method of reducing the number of computations
required in a Monte Carlo simulation, thus decreasing running time [2]. The main simpli-
fication of their method is implemented by approximating the trajectory between major
trajectory change points (TCPs) as straight lines, where TCPs represent notable course
or speed transitions.
Like with normal Monte Carlo simulation, the aircraft obtains its initial state information
from a random sample of the state PDF at time = 0. The velocity vector is then held
constant and the remaining states are projected forward in time. The velocity state is
only updated at each TCP. Yang and Kuchar simplify the method further by performing
simulations in the host aircraft’s frame of reference - an idea originally proposed by Paielli
and Erzberger [14]. If the host’s expected trajectory is subtracted from the intruder’s,
the trajectory of the intruder relative to the host is obtained. This allows the conflict
region to be placed at the location of the reference aircraft (the origin) and the number of
intersections between the conflict region and relative trajectory is accumulated. The total
number of intersections recorded over NGMC simulations divided by the total number of
random straight-line trajectories generated is the probability of conflict.
Yang and Kuchar succeeded in reducing simulation time to an order of 1 second. Using
10,000 Geometric Monte Carlo iterations for a two-dimensional two-aircraft scenario, they
achieved an error of 1.5 % in the probability of conflict. The speed and accuracy required
in a real-world scenario depends mostly the nature of the scenario, type of aircraft, level of
uncertainty and separation requirements. Yang and Kuchar postulated that a worst-case
accuracy of 5 % would be sufficient to differentiate between conflict and no conflict [2].
2.6.3 Wangermann and Stengel
Wangermann et al. [25] refer to aircraft, ATCs and ATM systems in a given environment
or system as agents. Agents are then defined as entities that can make decisions affecting
the entire system based on data it has available. Wangermann et al. propose a cognitive
model of decision-making and control for a so-called intelligent agent. This means that
agents can have varying interests and priorities when deciding how to react to specific
situations.
According to Yang et al. in 2000 [10], this method is the only probabilistic conflict avoid-
ance algorithm that is proposed to work for global (multiple aircraft) scenarios, as opposed
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to the pairwise approach in which each host and intruder pair is checked for conflict se-
quentially. The method defines the state of all agents in the environment and assumes
that no agent can have perfect knowledge of the entire system. Principled negotiation is
employed to determine a set of possible trajectories that would result in mutual gain for
all agents. The process consists of four stages:
1. Initiation
Agent 1 receives limited data regarding other agents and the environment. The
system states and plans are initialised. This step includes improving the current
plan or initialising an emergency plan.
2. Invent options for mutual gain
Agent 1 comes up with a set of options that would be beneficial for all agents,
particularly aircraft. This is done by using a process like Monte Carlo. The Monte
Carlo trajectories are then limited using a set of rules. These options are then
transmitted to Agent 2.
3. Assessment of options against objective criteria
Agent 2 then receives these options and uses objective criteria to choose the optimal
option for themselves based on fuel consumption or time for example. The agent
either accepts an option or rejects all the options. If the agent rejects the options
proposed, the agent must propose an alternative set of options.
4. Response
Agent 2 sends the responses back to Agent 1. The process is continuously repeated
in real-time.
Through continuous repetition, this system resembles a feedback loop in which the most
optimal, mutually beneficial plan is chosen for all agents. Problems with this method may
arise when consensus cannot be reached leading to the degradation of conflict alert time.
The principles by which negotiation is achieved also do not incorporate uncertainty into
the problem, which may result in inaccurate trajectory propagation.
The probability of conflict is never explicitly calculated in this method because scenarios
of conflict are not considered valid options. Because it is a cooperative method, it means
that the probability density functions of each agent’s position are dependent on one other
and one would need to calculate the joint probability density function of all the agents
in order to calculate the probability of conflict. This would be far too computationally
expensive for execution in real-time. However, this is an interesting approach to consider
in comparison with pairwise approaches.
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2.6.4 Jones (PDF Propagation)
A more efficient method of predicting conflict was proposed by Jones in 2006 [26]. Instead
of taking a repeated outcome approach like Monte Carlo, Jones suggested the propagation
of state distribution through a combination of approximation and convolution.
Conflict Region
Initial State PDF
Trajectory of State Mean
P1 =
ˆ
P2 =
ˆ
P3 =
ˆ
PC(t3) = P1 + P2 + P3
= + +
Figure 2.6: PDF Propagation and Distortion Process [4]
At each discrete time step in the future, the overlap between the state PDF and the
obstacle conflict region is integrated and accumulated. The total overlap accumulated
along the path at any time instant represents the total risk of conflict up to that time.
Once an intersection of the state PDF is accumulated, it is removed from the PDF before
it is propagated further.
This ensures that repeated accumulation of the same risk is avoided, but it also results
in a distortion of the state PDF. This makes it increasingly difficult to calculate over-
lap and continue propagation. Jones describes the PDF propagation process as a flow of
probability space into a hazard, an idea that inspired the work of Van Daalen discussed in
the next section. A two-dimensional representation of this process can be seen in figure 2.6.
To simplify the complex calculations associated with propagation of the distorted PDF,
Jones therefore assumes that the PDF remains unchanged, resulting in an upper bound
to the probability of conflict. This means that the probability of conflict is slightly larger
than the true value, leading to a more conservative estimate of conflict.
2.6.5 Van Daalen (Probability Flow)
The conflict detection method by Van Daalen is the extension of work done by Jones [4].
To the author’s knowledge, probability flow and Monte Carlo are the only existing probab-
ilistic methods capable of handling complex, non-linear, uncertain scenarios. Monte Carlo
simulation cannot be performed in real-time, which is why probability flow is the primary
focus of this thesis. It has the potential to most accurately perform real-time probabilistic
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conflict detection in a civil aviation context.
The risk accumulation method described by Jones is computationally expensive and time
consuming because it requires volume integration. Jones and Van Daalen therefore later
proposed a solution by defining probability flow as the accumulation of the rate of probab-
ility increase at the boundary of the obstacle conflict region – rather than the accumulation
of the overlap between the aircraft state PDF and the interior of the obstacle conflict re-
gion. The volume integration previously required is thereby reduced to surface integration,
drastically decreasing computation time.
A proof by Van Daalen [13] shows that the state PDF can be assumed unchanged with
each encounter with the conflict region. However, a tight upper bound is still present. The
difference to the true probability of conflict is sufficiently small to avoid false alarms and
sufficiently large to provide a conservative safety margin. This makes the algorithm ideal
for application in aviation where safety is prioritised above other performance factors.
2.7 Case Studies
By studying the records of previous aircraft collisions, insightful simulation scenarios can
be selected for the testing of conflict detection algorithms. According to the Bureau of
Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A), a total of 1581 crashes have occurred since the begin-
ning of 2005. The aircraft involved in these accidents include those belonging to military
authorities, commercial airlines and private aviation companies [27]. It is important to
note that although the focus of this thesis is specific to commercial aviation, the concepts
explored herein can be applied to all types of airborne vehicles.
Significant commercial aircraft collisions can be categorised into three different types:
controlled flight into terrain (CFIT), uncontrolled flight into terrain (UFIT) and mid-air
collision.
2.7.1 Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT)
CFIT occurs when an aircraft, which is considered to be airworthy and under full control of
a pilot is unintentionally flown into a stationary obstacle, such as the ground, a mountain,
building or mass of water. The primary cause of CFIT accidents is due to a pilot’s loss of
spatial awareness or the disregard of EGPWS warnings and instrument readings. A few
accidents have, however, been attributed to malfunctioning instruments.
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2.7.1.1 Poor Visibility
On 19 April 2000, Air Philippines Flight 541 was denied clearance from ATC for landing
because of runway traffic. The aircraft proceeded to circle the airport in anticipation of
a landing from the opposite direction. Visibility was poor due to low-lying cloud cover
and the pilot descended below the required 1500 ft at 8 km away from the airport. The
aircraft crashed into a coconut plantation on an island 500 ft above sea level. It is unclear
whether or not the pilot received EGPWS warnings, but the accident was attributed to
pilot error.
A more recent incident of pilot error occurred on the local Airblue Flight 202 on 28 July
2010 in Pakistan. The aircraft was circling the Benazir Bhutto airport for landing when it
crashed into the Margalla Hills near Islamabad. Prior to the crash, the pilot was instructed
by ATC to stay within a 9.3 km radius of the airport, but failed to do so, veering 15 km
North of the airport. Heavy rains and fog compromised visibility and caused ATC to lose
contact with the aircraft after issuing the instruction. The cockpit voice recorder captured
evidence that multiple “terrain ahead” warnings were issued by the EGPWS starting 40
seconds before the crash, but evasive action was not taken in time.
2.7.1.2 Short Landing
A short landing is when an aircraft is accidentally piloted into the static environment
during an approach or landing procedure before reaching the runway. An example of
a short landing incident occurred in July 2013 when Asiana Airlines Flight 214 hit the
sea wall dividing runway 28L at San Francisco international airport and the Pacific Ocean.
The pilot was performing a visual approach under VFR assisted by the runway’s Precision
Approach Path Indicator (PAPI). A PAPI is a light array that shines different colours
depending on the angle at which they are observed. If the pilot sees more white lights
than red, the aircraft is descending above the recommended glide-slope. Vice versa applies
if more red lights are observed than white. The optimal glide-slope is achieved if the pilot
can see an even PAPI light ratio.
After the crash, the National Transportation and Safety Board (NTSB) of the US found
that Asiana Airlines Flight 214 descended well below the desired glide-path, causing the
tail of the aircraft to strike the sea wall. The pilot reportedly tried to abort the landing,
but was unable to do so in time.
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2.7.1.3 Instrument Malfunction
Instances of instrument malfunction are extremely difficult to address. A malfunction
creates mistrust in the equipment, which can instigate incorrect flight management. In
January 2000, Kenya Airways Flight 431 crashed into the sea off the coast of Côte d’Ivoire
shortly after take-off. An electrical fault caused a false stall warning, prompting the pilot to
start descending. A GPWS alert was not issued because the stall warning took precedence.
Only after an over speed warning was issued, did the pilot initiate a climb, but it was too
late.
2.7.2 Uncontrolled Flight into Terrain (UFIT)
UFIT accidents occur when a pilot can no longer control an unstable aircraft because of
damage or malfunction. A collision with terrain in this case is often unavoidable even if
the correct procedures are followed by the flight crew.
Two examples of UFIT are Sita Air Flight 601 in September 2012 and Dana Air Flight 992
in June 2012. The former crashed on the banks of a river in Nepal after the pilot reported
technical issues following a suspected bird strike. The latter crashed upon airport approach
in Lagos, Nigeria after the pilot reported dual engine failure.
2.7.3 Mid-air Collision
A mid-air collision occurs between two or more aircraft and is less common than CFIT
[28]. Because aircraft travel at such high speeds, a mid-air collision is usually accompanied
by severe damage to at least one aircraft followed by UFIT. Mid-air collisions are more
challenging to predict and avoid because all parties involved are independently controlled.
One of the most well-known cases of mid-air collision occurred in Überlingen, Germany
between Bashkirian Airlines Flight 2937 and DHL Flight 611. Both aircraft were flying at
an altitude of 36,000 ft. Only 30 seconds before the crash, the air traffic controller on duty
noticed that they were on a collision course. He instructed the Bashkirian Airlines flight
to descend by 1000 ft and returned his attention to another aircraft landing at a nearby
airport. Meanwhile, the DHL flight received a TCAS RA to descend and the Bashkirian
Airlines flight received a corresponding RA to climb. The passenger aircraft ignored the
TCAS advisory and listened to the ATC instruction instead. The cargo plane followed the
TCAS advisory leading both aircraft on a descent towards one another.
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The DHL aircraft’s vertical stabiliser sliced through the fuselage of Flight 2937. Both
aircraft broke up and crashed in the fields below leaving no survivors. The crash prompted
ICAO to issue new policy stating that TCAS RAs should be given preference over ATC
instructions. The management of air traffic control services was also reviewed.
2.7.4 Observations
From these case studies, it is clear that the safe operation of passenger aircraft is reliant
on many factors. Firstly, training pilots to monitor their instruments closely and to heed
EGPWS warnings immediately is crucial in preventing CFIT accidents. The improvement
of collision avoidance systems is without purpose if pilots cannot trust and operate such
systems reliably.
A collision avoidance system is susceptible to the same risk of malfunction as any other
flight instrument and is only reliable if checked and maintained regularly. It should also
be noted that perhaps cockpit warnings should not be prioritised based on the type of
risk, but rather the urgency of the risk.
Furthermore, a collision avoidance system will unfortunately not help to prevent UFIT
accidents. The only preventative measures for this type of accident is the rigorous testing
of all aircraft components before they are deployed paired with strict, thorough mainten-
ance routines. Lastly, correct legislation and policy governing air traffic management as
well as instrument use is necessary to avoid confusion and facilitate the safe operation of
aircraft.
This section concludes the literature review chapter. The reader should now have a greater
understanding of the project context and objectives as well as a sufficient knowledge of
collision avoidance to continue with the modelling chapter.
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Chapter 3
Modelling
In this chapter, the proposed conflict avoidance framework is introduced and techniques
for modelling the static and dynamic environments are discussed.
3.1 Proposed Framework
A framework describes the relationship between different components in a system. A high-
level framework of the proposed conflict avoidance system is shown in figure 3.1 on the
following page.
The framework consists of 7 different components, referred to here as modules.
1. Initialise
When an aircraft is preparing for take off, the conflict avoidance system, flight com-
puters and other avionics are booted. The conflict avoidance system will download
any information it requires preflight and initialise all its variables. This includes the
GIS terrain database, aerodynamic constants, time parameters, error thresholds,
flight rules, airport descent profiles and the planned flight route. All on-board
sensors, instruments and control surfaces are also thoroughly checked by the pilot.
2. Model the Environment
Once the conflict avoidance system has been initialised, it begins to accumulate a
situational awareness of obstacles near the aircraft. This is achieved through the use
of the ADS-B infrastructure discussed in section 2.4.7 on page 20. A model of the
host aircraft is constructed by collecting state information from on-board sensors and
instruments. The terrain and intruder Minkowski sums (discussed later in section 3.4
on page 38) are then computed.
3. Predict the Future States
The conflict avoidance system should ideally prevent all conflict scenarios both on
the ground and in the air. The system should therefore become active as soon as the
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 3. MODELLING 33
1
2 3
6
4
current states
terrain mesh
terrain database
flight route
predicted trajectory
probability of conflict
5
trigger resolution
keep checking
7 amended safe route
issue TA
issue RA
trigger path planning
DETECTION
RESOLUTION
Figure 3.1: High-Level Conflict Avoidance Framework
aircraft begins to taxi. At this point, the simulation module will immediately begin to
predict the aircraft’s states and most importantly, its trajectory, for a specified time
interval into the future. State prediction involves propagating the current states of
the aircraft into the future within an envelope of uncertainty while taking available
intent information into account. This is a complex task, which demands its own
dedicated research focus. In this thesis, the future states are therefore assumed to
resemble the given intent information within an envelope of normally distributed
uncertainty. In other words, the predicted trajectory will roughly track the planned
flight route. In practice, path planning algorithms should be used to determine the
predicted trajectory. Currently, the aircraft is assumed to follow a straight-line in
the direction of the current velocity vector.
4. Calculate the Probability of Conflict
The conflict detection module uses the current and predicted aircraft states to de-
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termine the host aircraft’s conflict probability for the specified future time interval.
The probability flow method by Van Daalen is the chosen algorithm for this pur-
pose because it is believed to offer an accurate real-time solution while producing a
conservative result, making it ideal for civil aviation application.
5. Assess the Risk
Once the probability of conflict has been determined, it must be compared against
a predefined risk threshold. If the risk is above the threshold, a resolution process is
triggered. If the risk is below the threshold, there is no perceived threat of collision
and no action is taken. In civil aviation, risk thresholds are typically very low. In
this thesis, a risk threshold of 5% is chosen for demonstration purposes, but the
risk threshold should ultimately be chosen at the discretion of the system designer.
Once the risk has been assessed, the conflict avoidance system increments the future
time interval and returns to the beginning of the conflict detection process i.e. the
modelling module.
6. Decide on a Course of Action
If the conflict resolution module is triggered, the threat of collision is deemed dan-
gerous and warrants corrective action. Depending on the severity and nature of the
threat, a course of action appropriate to the situation is chosen. If a collision is not
imminent, but the risk is still significant, the pilot is simply issued a TA. The pilot
should then try to visually acquire the threat and use discretion to prevent further
provocation of risk. If a collision is imminent, the path planning module is triggered.
7. Find a Safe Alternative Path
Path planning methods are used to determine a safe alternative route when a high
probability of conflict is detected on the current predicted trajectory. Paths which
result in the smallest cost are desirable. Cost can be based on flight considerations
such as fuel consumption, passenger comfort, distance or time. Potential paths are
checked for conflict with a separate instance of the conflict detection module before
being deemed safe. Once the optimal safe path is found, the resolution module
suggests a sequence of appropriate resolution manoeuvres to the pilot. The flight
route is then amended and updated in the simulation module.
This thesis presents an implementation of the conflict detection module where all other
modules have been created purely to provide proof of concept for the probability flow
method. All other modules are therefore not implemented as they would be in practice,
but provide an adequate testing platform for the conflict detection module.
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3.2 Conflict Region
As previously stated, the conflict region is a volume of empty airspace encapsulating an
aircraft, which must be maintained in pursuance of regulated safety objectives. Because
safe separation criteria vary for different phases of flight and classes of aircraft, the conflict
region cannot be represented as a constant model.
At high altitudes, aircraft travel at high speeds. A large conflict region is therefore neces-
sary to ensure that conflict is detected further away, allowing the pilot sufficient time to
execute an evasive manoeuvre. A large conflict region would result in a conservative con-
flict detection system, but this could lead to a high frequency of unwarranted detections
in cluttered environments. As a consequence, pilots may mistrust the system and ignore
warnings, even when there may be a legitimate risk of collision.
Contrarily, in airport environments, a small conflict region is desirable where aircraft travel
at low speeds and manoeuvring space is limited. The size of the conflict region is therefore
kept variable throughout this thesis, depending on the simulation scenario.
The shape of the conflict region is often assumed to be a cylinder [14; 2; 29; 15] with 5
NM radius and 2000 ft height (see figure 3.2), corresponding to the current ICAO en-route
separation requirements [11]. Propagating a complex shape, such as a cylinder, forward in
time along a predicted trajectory is difficult because future changes in orientation cannot
be anticipated, adding to uncertainty in prediction.
5 NM
2000 ft
safety
margin
largest
dimension
aircraft
Figure 3.2: Cylindrical and Spherical Conflict Region Models
To keep uncertainty as low as possible, the conflict region is therefore assumed to be a
sphere, which is impervious to changes in pitch, roll and yaw. Furthermore, because this
thesis focuses largely on the airport environment, the radius of the conflict region is kept
tight with the largest dimension of the host aircraft under consideration. An additional
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safety margin can be added for different phases of flight at the discretion of the system
designer.
3.3 Terrain
In section 2.3.3 on page 13, the concept of GIS elevation maps is introduced. Unfortu-
nately, GIS maps are expensive and difficult to acquire for terrain near airports without
appropriate permissions. The Google elevation application programmers interface (API)
was identified as a viable alternative testing solution.
Google provides a free service to developers who wish to query the elevation of exact loca-
tions on the Earth. If an exact location’s elevation is not known, the elevation API returns
an interpolated average elevation from the 4 closest locations.
The limitations of the API under a non-commercial license are as follows:
• 2500 requests per 24-hour period
• 512 locations per request
• 25,000 locations in total per 24-hour period
• 10 requests per second
The elevation dataset is usually stored as a 2D position grid with an altitude corresponding
to each position in the matrix. Having discrete data means that the terrain can only be
approximated by interpolating between elevation points.
Detecting conflict with terrain involves determining if intersections occur between a pre-
dicted trajectory and the modelled surface. Calculating intersections with an arbitrary
surface is a complex task because the surface might contain trends and edges that cannot
be described mathematically. It is therefore common practice to break up the surface
into a polygon mesh of triangles. This technique is popular for its use in computer game
graphics, animation, robotics and mathematical modelling.
A triangular mesh is described by a collection of vertices, edges and faces. A vertex is a
point in space that forms the corner to at least one triangle and the intersection between
multiple triangles. An edge is simply a connection between two vertices. A face is an
enclosed triangle described by the connection of three edges.
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Vertices Edges Face Mesh
Figure 3.3: Polygon Mesh Terminology
Triangulation algorithms can be categorised into three different categories, namely Delaunay-
based, region growing and implicit surface reconstruction [30]. Delaunay-based triangula-
tion reconstructs a surface such that no point in the dataset lies within the circumcircle of
any triangle in the mesh. The circumcircle (or circumscribed circle) is a circle that encloses
and passes through all the vertices of a mesh face. This ensures that the minimum interior
angle of all triangles is maximised. There are numerous implementations of the Delaunay
method [31; 32; 33; 34; 35], but one of the most useful is contained in the open-source
C++ Computational Geometry Algorithms Library (CGAL) [36].
An advantage of using Delaunay triangulation is that data points can be processed in
any order, which means that the mesh can be edited once constructed. The algorithm
also allows for the concentration of smaller triangles in areas of high resolution and larger
triangles in areas with less gradients. Furthermore, the exact location dataset values are
used, making it convenient for approximation of location-specific surfaces such as moun-
tains, buildings and roads etc.
Although Delaunay triangulation may be very accurate, it is, however, very slow to com-
pute due to its complexity. For large meshes in computer memory, arbitrary access patterns
can lead to memory thrash [37]. Thrashing occurs when a computer’s virtual memory is
in a cycle of rapidly exchanging data in temporary memory for data on disk, seizing pro-
cessing power needed by other applications.
The region growing method initially prunes a single triangle face from the dataset and
subsequently iterates through the rest of the data in order to attach new triangles to
the region’s boundary. Various examples of the region growing method can be found in
[38; 39; 40; 41]. This method of triangulation is extremely fast in comparison to Delaunay,
but it depends heavily on user-defined parameters, sample density and data noise, making
it difficult to guarantee a closed manifold model i.e. no missing edges [30].
The implicit surface method relies on the creation of a 3D signed distance function from
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a set of sample points. A signed distance function is used to determine whether or not
a given point lies within the boundary of a set of points. The function assigns positive
values for points inside the boundary, negative values for those that lie outside and zero
to points on the boundary. The surface mesh is therefore constructed from the subset of
values for which the signed distance function is zero. Adaptations of the implicit surface
method can be found in [42; 43; 44; 45] and a review of these methods can be found
in [46]. Unlike Delaunay and region growing triangulation, the implicit surface method
approximates the sample points instead of interpolating them, meaning that accuracy is
heavily compromised.
For the purpose of this thesis, Delaunay-based methods are most ideal because terrain
model accuracy can be preserved. Slow execution is of little consequence if terrain mesh-
ing can occur once before each flight. This is, however, only possible if there is prior
knowledge of the aircraft’s flight path and potential surface span. Even so, it may not be
possible to mesh and store such large expanses of terrain data on flight computers.
In practice, it is suggested that small portions of anticipated terrain data be downloaded
via satellite a few seconds before the conflict detection system requires it. This would allow
sufficient time for meshing to occur before the terrain model is needed. In this thesis,
knowledge of the predicted trajectory is assumed, so the expanse of terrain it covers is
therefore meshed using Delaunay triangulation once before each simulation (“pre-flight”).
3.4 Minkowski Addition
Minkowski addition is often used in robot motion planning to determine a vehicle’s con-
figuration space i.e. the available manoeuvring region in the environment. For two sets of
position vectors describing the conflict regions of the host and intruder aircraft, Rh and
Ri respectively, in 3D Euclidean space, the Minkowski sum can be calculated by adding
each coordinate vector rh in Rh to each coordinate vector ri in Ri (see equation 3.4.1).
This is in essence the convolution between the two aircraft’s conflict regions. It can also
be thought of as the union of all translations of Rh by a 3D point in Ri. [47]
Rh +Ri = {rh + ri|rh ∈ Rh, ri ∈ Ri} (3.4.1)
To find the configuration space in an airport environment, Minkowski addition must be
performed not only between the host aircraft and all intruder aircraft, but between the
host aircraft and all obstacles, including terrain and protected airspace. Minkowski addi-
tion results in a “swollen” environment model allowing the host aircraft to be modelled
and propagated as a point mass.
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For complex shapes, Minkowski addition is a computationally expensive process. For the
case of determining the Minkowski sum between the host and intruder aircraft, the choice
of a spherical conflict region simplifies the problem considerably. For a non-spherical re-
gion, the Minkowski sum would need to be recomputed at each time step of propagation.
However, because a sphere does not change with orientation, the Minkowski sum need
only be calculated once before each flight. The Minkowski sum of the host aircraft with
an intruder is then simply a sphere with a radius equal to the sum of both aircraft’s conflict
region radii (see figure 3.4).
Rh
Ri
Rh + Ri
ri
rh
rh + ri
Figure 3.4: Minkowski Addition of the Host Aircraft with an Intruder Aircraft
Calculating the Minkowski sum of the host aircraft with terrain is more difficult because
terrain is so irregular. However, once the surface is broken up into a polygon mesh of
triangles, an estimate of the Minkowski sum can be obtained. The approximate Minkowski
sum is found by raising each mesh vertex by the radius of the host aircraft conflict region.
This must be done in the direction of the net normal vector of the surrounding faces. For
a single triangular face with vertices p0, p1 and p2, the normal vector extending outwards
from the centre of the triangle is
nf = (p1 − p0)× (p2 − p0). (3.4.2)
The magnitude of each normal vector is proportional to the area of the mesh face. The
net normal vector at a vertex is found by combining the normal vectors of the mesh faces
sharing that vertex as follows:
npj =
NF∑
i=1
nfi (3.4.3)
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where NF is the total number of mesh faces and j ∈ [0, 1, 2 . . . (NV − 1)] where NV is
the total number of mesh vertices.
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(a) Normal Vectors on Mesh Vertices
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(b) Completed Minkowski Sum
Figure 3.5: Small-Scale Minkowski Addition Example of Sphere with Terrain
The net normal vector is then scaled by its reciprocal length to get the unit normal vector
at the vertex. The radius of the intruder aircraft can now be added to each mesh vertex
in the direction of the unit normal vector to find the approximate Minkowski sum.
pnew = pold + rhnp (3.4.4)
An example of minkowski addition between a small sphere of radius 0.5 metres with a
meshed 3× 3 metre hill is shown in figure 3.5.
3.5 Generic Aircraft Model
A model of the host aircraft’s dynamics is needed to perform Monte Carlo simulation.
In this section, the axis systems, notation, sub-systems and basic dynamic relationships
associated with such a model are introduced. The specifics of the model used for simulation
in this thesis is discussed at length in section 4.3 on page 48.
3.5.1 Principal Axis System
The principal axis system is fixed to the aircraft with the origin placed at the centre of
mass Cm (see figure 3.6 on the following page). The longitudinal axis XP lies in the plane
of symmetry extending through the aircraft’s nose and tail, the lateral axis YP extends per-
pendicularly to the fuselage through both wings and the normal axis ZP extends through
the top and bottom of the aircraft. By convention, the positive longitudinal direction is
towards the nose, the positive lateral direction is towards the right wing and the positive
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 3. MODELLING 41
normal direction is downwards. Rotation about the longitudinal, lateral and normal axes
is called roll, pitch and yaw respectively. [5] In the principal axis system, the notation
described in table 3.1 is used.
pitch
yaw
roll
ZP
XP
YP
Cm
Elevator
Rudder
Aileron
Figure 3.6: Aircraft Principal Axis System
Table 3.1: Aircraft Principal Axis Symbol Definitions
Symbols Meaning
X,Y, Z Force vector coordinates in the XP , YP and ZP axes respectively
L,M,N Roll, pitch and yaw moments respectively
U, V,W Linear velocity vector coordinates in the XP , YP and ZP axes respectively
P,Q,R Roll, pitch and yaw rates (angular velocity) respectively
V Velocity magnitude calculated by: V =
√
U2 + V 2 +W 2
α Angle of attack between the XPYP -plane and V calculated by: α = arctan
(
W
U
)
β Angle of sideslip between the XPZP -plane and V calculated by: β = arcsin
(
V
V
)
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3.5.2 Inertial Axis System
In order to apply Newton’s first law of motion, the use of an inertial reference frame is
necessary. Any reference frame that is in uniform motion relative to the stars preserves the
validity of Newton’s first law. In aerospace, the North-East-Down (NED) axis system is
used (shown in figure 3.7). The East-West axis is tangent to the Earth’s circles of latitude,
or parallels, and the North-South axis is tangent to the Earth’s lines of longitude, or
meridians. Assuming the Earth to be a sphere, the Up-Down axis extends in the direction
of the Earth’s centre.
In aviation, the origin of the axis system is usually fixed to the aircraft’s centre of gravity.
However, for short-range applications, the axis system can be fixed to a flight starting
point, but this assumes a flat, non-rotating model of the Earth. [5] This assumption is
justified for use in this thesis because the look-ahead time in the presented scenarios is
small (30 - 60 seconds), resulting in short travelled distances.
North
East
South
West
ZI
XI
YI
(0,0,0)
Figure 3.7: NED Axis System
In the inertial axis system, the notation in table 3.2 is used. Euler angles Φ,Θ,Ψ are
popular for describing roll, pitch and yaw angles because of their simplicity. However, a
singularity always exists at a ± 90 degree pitch angle for Euler angles ordered 3-2-1.
Table 3.2: Aircraft Inertial Axis Symbol Definitions
Symbols Meaning
N,E,D Position vector coordinates in the North, East and Down axes respectively
Φ,Θ,Ψ Euler 3-2-1 attitude parameters of the principal axis system relative to the
inertial axis system
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The order describes the sequence of rotation following the initial alignment of the prin-
cipal and inertial axis systems. In the case of 3-2-1, the sequence is first yaw, then pitch
and lastly roll (see figure 3.8). To avoid the singularity present when using Euler angles,
alternative parametrisations such as Quaternions can be employed, but these are more
complex to work with and less intuitive than Euler. Fortunately, on conventional com-
mercial passenger flights, a 90 degree pitch angle is never achieved and the singularity is
never realised.
ND-plane
NE-plane
NE-plane
ψ
θ
φ
Figure 3.8: Euler Angles of Attitude
3.5.3 Conversion between Axis Systems
For the two axis systems described above, it is sometimes convenient to convert vectors,
such as position and velocity, from the one axis system to the other. This is achieved
through the use of a transformation matrix. The direction cosine matrix (DCM) in equa-
tion 3.5.1, denoted by Λ, is valid only for right-hand systems.
Λ =

cos θ cosψ sinφ sin θ cosψ − cosφ sinψ sinφ sinψ + cosφ sin θ cosψ
cos θ sinψ cosφ cosψ + sinφ sin θ sinψ cosφ sin θ sinψ − sinφ cosψ
− sin θ sinφ cos θ cosφ cos θ

(3.5.1)
The transformation can be performed from inertial to principal coordinates as follows:
xI
yI
zI

= Λ

xP
yP
zP

. (3.5.2)
To transform from the principal to inertial axis system, the inverse of the transformation
matrix is used, which due to its orthogonality, is simply the transpose.
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
xP
yP
zP

= Λ−1

xI
yI
zI

= ΛT

xI
yI
zI

(3.5.3)
3.5.4 Basic Framework
A simple framework depicting the component relationships in a generic aircraft model is
shown in figure 3.9. The aerodynamic forces and moments are responsible for the majority
of uncertainty in the model. Various aerodynamic coefficients, describing lift and drag for
instance, form part of equations that govern a specific aircraft’s motion. The thrust model
describes the aircraft engine propulsion capabilities and the gravitational model describes
the force of the Earth’s pull on an aircraft.
Aerodynamic Model
Thrust Model
Gravitational Model
Kinetics Kinematics
Force and Moment Model 6 DOF EOM Model
Forces
Moments
States
Controls
Figure 3.9: Basic Aircraft Model by Peddle [5]
Kinematics is a field of mechanics that describes the relationship between different variables
of motion over time, such as velocity, attitude and position. Kinetics then relates the
forces and moments acting on the aircraft with the associated kinematic states. Together,
kinetics and kinematics form the 6 degree-of-freedom (DOF) equations of motion (EOM)
model. [5]
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Chapter 4
Implementation
This chapter discusses all steps taken in the implementation and testing of the probability
flow algorithm. This includes the development of a software testing platform, the gen-
eration of terrain data for the environment model and the augmentation of the aircraft
model to accurately imitate a real aircraft in Monte Carlo simulation. The definition of
probability flow is given in this chapter and numerical integration techniques are examined
for approximating the complex integrals present in the definition. Lastly, a discussion on
how to interpret a combined probability of conflict for multiple conflict events is presented.
4.1 Software Overview
Before examining the technical details associated with the Monte Carlo and probability
flow methods, the implemented software architecture is introduced. The architecture is
similar to the proposed framework in figure 3.1 on page 33, but the flow of execution more
closely resembles a sequential set of steps.
1. Variable Initialisation
The first step in the simulation of each scenario is to initialise all time constants
and sample specifications. The paths to all necessary libraries and data files are also
created.
2. Aircraft and Terrain Data Retrieval
The next step is to define the specifications of all aircraft involved in the scenario
including their dimensions, class and initial state values. These initial state values
along with any intent information is retrieved from separate data files to simulate the
procedure of a conflict avoidance system fetching information from external sources,
such as ADS-B and sensors for instance. Terrain data is also retrieved from an
external data file as if to simulate a GPS or EGPWS query, but if the data for a
specific location is not available, it is generated using the Google Elevation API.
3. Conflict Region Construction (Minkowski)
Now that the system has collected knowledge of all aircraft and the environment,
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the conflict region is constructed. This is essentially the Minkowski sum of the host
aircraft with all other aircraft and the Minkowski sum of the host aircraft with the
terrain elevation dataset. These regions are then meshed and stored in memory.
4. Trajectory Prediction
Using the initial state information collected in step 2, the trajectories of all aircraft in
the environment are predicted. If intent information is available, a set of waypoints
is constructed to form the desired flight route. If no intent information is retrieved
for a particular aircraft, the predicted trajectory is approximated by projecting a
straight line in the direction of the initial velocity vector. This method of trajectory
prediction may seem primitive, but it is not the primary focus of this thesis and is
therefore only presented to provide proof of concept.
5. Monte Carlo Simulation
For each aircraft in the environment, NMC Monte Carlo forward simulations must
be performed. The aircraft model is initialised with the time constants specified in
step 1 and the waypoints generated in step 4. The initial state values of the model
are randomly selected from a pre-determined PDF of those states (discussed later in
section 4.4.1 on page 57). The velocity and position along each randomly generated
Monte Carlo trajectory is stored for each aircraft simulation.
6. Calculation of Mean and Covariance
Now that NMC trajectories have been generated for each aircraft, the mean and
covariance along each aircraft’s simulated path can be calculated. These values are
required for mesh reduction in the next step as well as for the execution of the
probability flow algorithm.
7. Mesh Reduction
Before calculating the host aircraft’s probability of conflict, mesh reduction tech-
niques are applied to reduce computation time. Mesh reduction entails discarding
all points that are not within 10 standard deviations of the mean and reducing the
number of mesh faces in areas of low detail.
8. Calculate Probability of Conflict (Monte Carlo)
The “ground-truth” probability of conflict is now calculated for the host aircraft.
This is achieved by running a mesh intersection routine (described in section 4.4.2
on page 58) on all the host aircraft’s Monte Carlo trajectories. The probability of
conflict is determined by dividing the total number of detected mesh intersections
by the total number of trajectories.
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9. Calculate Probability of Conflict (Probability Flow)
Finally, the probability flow method can be evaluated. The specifics of the algorithm
are discussed in section 4.5.
4.2 Environment Model
To obtain the elevation of a particular point on the Earth, the Google Elevation API must
be queried with a specific value of latitude and longitude. A query is performed using an
HTTP request URL. This URL is of the form:
http://maps.googleapis.com/maps/api/elevation/outputFormat?parameters
The output is either returned in the JSON or XML description format. In this thesis, it was
decided to retrieve elevation data in XML format because it is simple to understand, parse
and interface with MATLAB. To make the solution simpler, an open-source XML toolbox
available on MATLAB File Exchange is used to facilitate the execution and interpretation
of API queries [48].
To query the elevation of a single point on Earth, the parameters argument in the request
URL becomes locations=latitude,longitude. However, if the elevation along a path
is desired, this becomes
locations=lat_start,lon_start|lat_end,lon_end&samples=num_samples.
By specifying the samples argument, discrete, equally-spaced elevation data can be ob-
tained along a path with a specified starting and ending latitude and longitude using only
a single request. A square elevation map can therefore be generated by performing NR
requests with each request containing NR samples.
Due to the daily usage limits (mentioned in section 3.3 on page 36), an elevation map
containing a maximum of 25,000 data points can be generated per day. This is equivalent
to a 158 × 158 point map.
In order to create maps large enough to include hazardous features such as mountains,
it was decided to compromise on resolution and request elevations at locations further
apart than at a distance that would result in the highest resolution. The distance between
samples is therefore chosen to be 0.003◦ in latitude and longitude, which is approxim-
ately 45 metres. The conversion between degrees of latitude and longitude to distance is
performed using the Haversine formula:
∆M = 2rE arcsin
(√
sin2
(
ϕ2 − ϕ1
2
)
+ cos(ϕ1) cos(ϕ2) sin2
(
λ2 − λ1
2
))
(4.2.1)
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where rE is the radius of the Earth, assumed to be spherical, (ϕ1, λ1) is respectively the
latitude and longitude of point 1, (ϕ2, λ2) is respectively the latitude and longitude of
point 2 and ∆M is the distance between the two points.
4.3 Aircraft Model
Accurately describing the control and dynamics of the host and intruder aircraft is imper-
ative to predicting collisions in the future. In this section, a brief overview is given of the
model used in this thesis as well as a discussion on the implementation of a turbulence
module, cross-track controller and altitude controller.
4.3.1 Overview
A Simulink model representative of an aircraft similar to the Airbus A330 class is available
to this thesis and is therefore the model used in all test scenarios. The basic model
framework can be seen in figure 4.1.
pilot inputs
control laws
actuators
disturbance
aircraft sensors outputs
Figure 4.1: Non-Linear Closed-Loop Aircraft Model
The control laws of the aircraft model govern the movement of the aircraft’s actuators
based on the current states of the aircraft and desired inputs from the pilot. Pilot inputs
include those of the side stick, pedals, high lift configuration lever, air brakes and throttle
lever.
The aircraft module seen in figure 4.1 corresponds to the basic aircraft model of figure 3.9
on page 44. The aircraft’s flight mechanics and performance factors are described herein
and are used to create a representation of the current aircraft states given the present
state of the aircraft’s actuators and environment. The aircraft module in simulation is
essentially an approximation of how a real aircraft would react to actuator commands and
atmospheric conditions in practice.
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While the aircraft module provides a true representation of the current aircraft states, a
sensor module is used to model the inaccuracies and uncertainty often present in onboard
instruments. The current states are therefore augmented through the sensor module to
produce a more realistic, rough estimation of the aircraft’s current states. These estimated
states are then fed back to the pilot and the control module, where decisions are made
based on what the aircraft is currently observed to be doing.
The disturbance present in figure 4.1 is a model of atmospheric conditions, which may per-
turb the aircraft. For instance, strong winds, pressure fluctuations, temperature changes
and turbulence are all factors, which may cause unexpected deviations from the desired
control status. The modelling of this disturbance is discussed in more detail in the follow-
ing section.
The output module in the aircraft model simply provides an interface for the retrieval of
flight data. This data lays the foundation for the Monte Carlo simulation and probability
flow validation performed in this thesis.
4.3.2 Disturbance
In order to replicate the uncertainty present in the states of a real aircraft, the disturbance
due to atmospheric conditions must be modelled. The primary goal of disturbance mod-
elling in this thesis is to facilitate Monte Carlo simulation, which requires the generation
of random trajectories.
In reality, if a pilot could exercise the exact same control every time a specific route is
flown, differences in the aircraft state values will still occur due to the unpredictable influ-
ence of the factors such as the environment, fuel consumption and load for instance. If the
aircraft model is considered without disturbance in simulation, the flight data retrieved
from the output module is identical over multiple iterations provided that the model in-
puts remain the same for each simulation.
To ensure that the model behaviour is indeed kept uniform, the model is flown under
autopilot conditions. The model in figure 4.1 on the preceding page facilitates autopilot
control through the use of a sideslip angle, flightpath angle and yaw angle hold mode.
This means that the aircraft model can be initialised with a desired roll, pitch and yaw
deflection respectively. The aircraft controllers then attempt to keep the aircraft on par
with these angles in the presence of a disturbance until a new hold command is issued.
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In this thesis, the effects of pressure fluctuations, temperature changes and constant winds
are ignored in favour of a simple turbulence model capable of achieving a relevant envelope
of uncertainty for Monte Carlo simulation. Turbulence is ideal for this purpose because
it consists of random, unpredictable wind gusts, which, when introduced into the system,
will cause the current aircraft states to become stochastic. The uncertainty due to turbu-
lence is therefore characterised by a probability distribution.
There are 2 prominent models when it comes to describing continuous wind gusts, namely
the Dryden and Von Kármán wind models. Both models describe turbulence using
stochastic processes defined by the vertical, lateral, longitudinal and angular compon-
ents of velocity. These processes are created by passing band-limited white noise through
appropriate forming filters. Different power spectral densities are specified by Dryden and
Von Kármán for the band-limited white noise. [49; 50]
A Dryden turbulence model following MIL-F-8785C military specifications was made avail-
able to this project by Airbus. The model takes the aircraft’s current airspeed, altitude
at the centre of gravity, Euler angles and ground track as input from the sensor model.
Ground track refers the aircraft’s heading in the inertial axis system. The only constant
supplied to the model is the wingspan of the aircraft, which, in the case of the Airbus
A330 class of aircraft, is 60 m.
The last input of the turbulence model is a vector of 4 noise seeds for the band-limited white
noise of the 4 output components seen in figure 4.2 on the next page. Seeds are integers
on the interval [0, (231 − 1)] representing different random number streams in MATLAB.
In the Airbus turbulence model, seeds are limited to the interval [1, 365]. The purpose of
seeds is to allow a user to replicate results in simulations, which use band-limited white
noise. For Monte Carlo simulation, using the same noise seeds would produce identical
turbulence patterns in every simulation. This is undesirable and the 4 noise seeds are
therefore randomised by sampling a uniform distribution over the interval [1, 365].
The model outputs turbulence as wind velocity in the inertial axes, denoted by WTN , WTE
and WTD respectively, as well as in the aircraft roll axis, denoted by WTP . It is assumed
that only these 4 components are taken into account because they have the most significant
impact on the aircraft behaviour. The wind velocities in the inertial axis system are then
converted to the principal axis system before being subtracted from the aircraft’s current
airspeed in the aircraft module of figure 4.1. Similarly, the angular wind velocity in the
aircraft roll axis is subtracted from the aircraft’s current roll rate. A simulation of the
aircraft model with turbulence can be seen in figure 4.3 on the following page.
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Dryden
MIL-F-8785C
noise seeds
wingspan
airspeed (kts)
altitude (ft)
φ (deg.)
θ (deg.)
ψ (deg.)
track (deg.)
WTN (m/s)
WTE (m/s)
WTD (m/s)
WTP (m/s)
Turbulence
Figure 4.2: Inputs and Outputs of the Dryden Wind Model
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Figure 4.3: Graphs showing Cross-track Position and Altitude with Disturbance over 5 Minutes
4.3.3 Cross-track Control
When the aircraft model is disturbed under autopilot conditions, the aircraft will deviate
from its current trajectory. The autopilot will correct the deviation and return the aircraft
to its original hold mode, but it will not return it to its original path. For example, in
figure 4.4, the aircraft is commanded to fly straight-and-level. When a wind gust disturbs
the aircraft pushing the nose to the right, a deviation from the flight route occurs mo-
mentarily before the autopilot compensates for the disturbance returning the aircraft back
to straight-and-level flight.
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disturbance
autopilot correction
desired trajectory
actual trajectory
deviation
Figure 4.4: Deviation Caused by a Wind Gust
The cross-track deviation shown in figure 4.4 is not corrected by the autopilot. Using
the aircraft model, a forward simulation was performed 500 times under autopilot control.
The aircraft was commanded to fly straight-and-level for 5 minutes in medium turbulence.
The resulting cross-track position over time and the corresponding standard deviation over
time is shown in figure 4.5.
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Figure 4.5: Aircraft Cross-track Variability over Time without Cross-track Controller
Increasing cross-track deviation from the desired flight route is observed. In reality, the
pilot would either change the autopilot settings or take manual control of the aircraft in a
turbulence situation to correct the deviation. To achieve a somewhat similar correction in
simulation, a cross-track controller paired with a waypoint scheduler is implemented. It
should be noted, however, that the cross-track and altitude controllers presented in this
thesis are in no way representative of the ideal controllers required to accurately model
the real-world operation of an aircraft. The controllers presented are implemented here
solely for the purpose of achieving controllable flight paths in the simulation experiments
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to follow.
Waypoint Scheduler
position
waypoints
+−
cross-track error
ψ-track
cross-track reference
Kψ ++
ψ-reference
Figure 4.6: Cross-track Controller using Yaw Angle Hold Mode
The cross-track controller makes use of the existing autopilot hold modes to create a
consistent envelope of uncertainty around the desired trajectory. This is achieved by
producing a heading command proportional to the cross-track error. To obtain the cross-
track error, the aircraft position must first be transformed from inertial axis coordinates
to a new guidance axis system, depicted in figure 4.7.
source waypoint
destination waypoint
Ltrack
aircraft
(E, N)
(Esrc, Nsrc)
(Edest., Ndest.)
ψtrack
xd
yd
N
E
Figure 4.7: Guidance Axis System adapted from [5]
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The aircraft’s cross-track position, denoted by (E,D), is transformed usingxd
yd
 =
 cos(ψtrack) sin(ψtrack)− sin(ψtrack) cos(ψtrack)

N −Nsrc
E − Esrc
 (4.3.1)
where ψtrack is the heading of the flight route and (Esrc, Esrc) is the source (reference)
waypoint in inertial axis coordinates. The desired heading is calculated inside the waypoint
scheduler using
ψtrack = arctan
Edest. − Esrc
Ndest. −Nsrc (4.3.2)
where (Edest, Ndest) is the destination waypoint. The resulting xd in equation 4.3.1 is the
along-track distance from the source waypoint along the flight route and yd is the cross-
track error or distance perpendicular to the flight route.
The cross-track controller is designed to control yd to a zero reference. The cross-track
error is first scaled by a gain value Kψ before being added to the current heading angle
to produce a heading command. The gain value was empirically chosen and adjusted to
Kψ = 0.03 where a steady-state cross-track standard deviation was observed in simulation.
Finally, the resulting heading command, denoted by ψ-reference, is sent to the yaw angle
hold controller to compensate for any cross-track deviatons.
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Figure 4.8: The Effect of Cross-Track Control on Aircraft Position
The waypoint scheduler compares the along-track distance xd to the distance from the
source waypoint to the destination waypoint, denoted by Ltrack, at each time step. Ltrack
is calculated using
Ltrack =
√
(Ndest. −Nsrc)2 + (Edest. − Esrc)2. (4.3.3)
When xd is larger than Ltrack, the waypoint scheduler makes the source waypoint equal to
the destination waypoint and the destination waypoint is incremented. The aircraft model
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is therefore now capable of following a desired trajectory within a consistent envelope of
uncertainty.
4.3.4 Altitude Control
Altitude control is performed similarly, although independently, to cross-track control.
The aim is to create a controller that produces a flightpath angle command proportional
to the altitude error. The format of the controller is shown in figure 4.9.
Waypoint Scheduler
position
waypoints
+−
altitude error
θ-track
altitude reference
Kθ ++
θ-reference
Figure 4.9: Altitude Controller using Flightpath Angle Hold Mode
The guidance axis system showing a view of altitude axis is shown in figure 4.10 on the
following page. The desired flight path angle, denoted by θtrack, is calculated using
θtrack = arctan
Ddest. −Dsrc√
x2d + y2d
. (4.3.4)
The altitude error zd can then be calculated using
zd = tan(θtrack)hd + gd (4.3.5)
where hd is the distance in the NE-plane from the source waypoint to the aircraft, calcu-
lated by hd =
√
x2d + y2d, and gd is the difference in altitude from the source waypoint to
the aircraft, calculated by gd = D −Dsrc.
The gain, Kθ, is once again chosen empirically and adjusted until a consistent standard
deviation on the aircraft altitude is observed over time.
Before altitude control is employed, the repeated forward simulation of the aircraft model
revealed an increasing loss of altitude over time under straight-and-level autopilot condi-
tions (see figure 4.11).The standard deviation of altitude is observed to be fairly consistent,
but deviation from the target altitude still increases over time. When turbulence disturbs
the aircraft from straight-and-level flight, a shift in lift is experienced, resulting in a loss
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source waypoint
destination waypoint
aircraft
(N , E, D)
(Nsrc, Esrc, Dsrc)
(Ndest., Edest., Ddest.)
θtrack
NE − plane
D-axis
zd
hd
gd
Figure 4.10: Guidance Axis System showing Vertical Plane
of speed and the dominance of gravitational forces. Without an increase in thrust, the
aircraft descends over time.
With the application of altitude control, the desired consistent envelope of uncertainty is
achieved. Initially, a small loss of altitude is experienced during the transition of the initial
trim conditions to a steady-state, but the deviation is quickly corrected in approximately
10 seconds.
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(b) Altitude over Time with Altitude Controller
Figure 4.11: The Effect of Altitude Control on Aircraft Position
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4.4 Monte Carlo
The Monte Carlo method is used in this thesis to determine a “ground-truth” result for
comparison with the probability flow method of Van Daalen.
4.4.1 Initialisation
To generate a set of random trajectories, the aircraft model states must be initialised with
a random sample from the PDF of those states. The initial state PDF is unknown, but
it can be determined using a forward-simulation of the model under autopilot conditions
with disturbance.
First, the trim values of the model must be found by forward-simulating the open-loop
model without turbulence. The open-loop model states are initialised with guessed values
informed by the desired inputs of the specific flight scenario, such as initial speed, head-
ing and position. Over time, the states of the open-loop system converge to steady-state
values, which are then used as the trim conditions for the closed-loop model.
The closed-loop aircraft model initialised with the trim conditions can now be simulated
forward in time with disturbance. Because of the presence of a disturbance, the aircraft
states never reach a constant value. The model is therefore simulated NMC times and at
the point where the states are observed to be relatively consistent across NMC trajectories,
the PDF of those states is calculated. The question is then, how many simulations need
to be performed to calculate an accurate representation of the state PDF? It was decided
that the value of NMC should be chosen based on the 2σ-rule, which states that 95% of
all values must lie within 2 standard deviations of the mean.
It was found that 407 simulations are needed to satisfy this criterion. Equation 4.4.1 can
also be used to calculate NMC if an estimate of the standard deviation σMC is known. A
desired error margin Em is chosen as 1 metre and the z-score associated with a 95% con-
fidence level in a standard normal distribution is denoted by zα/2. Running the simulation
50 times revealed an estimate of the standard deviation to be 10.29 metres.
N =
(
zα/2 σR
Em
)2
=
(
z(1−0.952 )10.29
1
)2
=
((1.96)(10.29)
1
)2
≈ 407 (4.4.1)
For each Monte Carlo simulation, the aircraft states are initialised with a random sample
from their PDFs. In doing so, it is observed that occasionally a random combination
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of initial values that deviate largely from the trim conditions can lead to initial transi-
ents in the aircraft response. This is because the aircraft state values cannot be decoupled
and the aircraft should in fact be initialised with a sample from the joint PDF of the states.
Calculating the joint state-PDF is a complex process due to the large number of states.
This is therefore avoided by only initialising the position states with a random sample from
its PDF while the remaining states are initialised at trim. The model is then forward-
simulated until the remaining states settle and flight data is discarded up to that point.
Initialising the position state with a random sample allows the aircraft to achieve normally
distributed states quicker than if it were initialised at a single point. Less initial flight data
therefore has to be discarded from each simulation. Referring to figure 4.8(b) on page 54, it
is observed that it takes approximately 10 seconds for the cross-track and altitude standard
deviations to reach a steady-state. With a sampling time of 0.01 seconds, this means that
the first 1000 samples of every simulation must be discarded.
4.4.2 Calculating Mesh Intersections
For every randomly generated trajectory, it is necessary to determine if an intersection
occurs with each meshed conflict region. Each random trajectory is therefore described as
a polyline, or series of arbitrary points making up a line. Each polyline is then checked
individually for intersection with each triangle face in each mesh.
There exists no simple solution for the intersection between a polyline and a mesh, so
the polyline is divided into a series of very small straight-line segments. Each triangular
face of the conflict region mesh is then treated as an infinite plane [51]. The intersection
between a straight-line and a plane is identified when the parametric line in equation 4.4.2
is evaluated at sI .
p(sI) = p0 + sI(p1 − p0) (4.4.2)
p0 and p1 are the start and end points of a line segment respectively. The value of sI is
calculated as follows:
sI =
nf · (v0 − p0)
nf · (p1 − p0) (4.4.3)
The normal vector nf is calculated from equation 3.4.2 on page 39 and v0 to v2 represent
the vertices of a triangular face. When the denominator of equation 4.4.3 is 0, the segment
lies parallel to the plane and therefore no intersection occurs. If the denominator is non-
zero and real, and 0 ≤ sI ≤ 1, then the segment intersects the plane. Once an intersection
has been identified, it must be determined whether or not the intersection point lies within
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the triangular face, and not just elsewhere on the plane [51]. The parametric plane equation
is given by
v(a, b) = v0 + a(v1 − v0) + b(v2 − v0) (4.4.4)
The point p(a, b) is inside the triangle only if a ≥ 0, b ≥ 0 and a+ b ≤ 1. Equation 4.4.5
is used to calculate aI and equation 4.4.6 is used to calculate bI where u = v1 − v0,
q = v2 − v0 and w = p(sI)− v0.
aI =
(u·q)(w·q)− (q·q)(w·u)
(u·q)2 − (u·u)(q·q) (4.4.5)
bI =
(u·q)(w·u)− (u·u)(w·q)
(u·q)2 − (u·u)(q·q) (4.4.6)
Pseudocode for the mesh intersection checking process is given below.
Algorithm 1 Mesh Intersection Algorithm
1: total conflict = 0
2: for each mesh face do
3: den = denominator of equation 4.4.3
4: if den != 0 and den is real then si = numerator of equation 4.4.3 / den
5: if si >= 0 and si <= 1 then
6: a = equation 4.4.5
7: if a >= 0 and a <= 1 then
8: b = equation 4.4.6
9: if b >= 0 and (a + b <= 1) then
10: total conflict = total conflict + 1
11: detected = true
12: end if
13: end if
14: end if
15: end if
16: if detected == true then
17: break
18: end if
19: end for
4.4.3 Memory Management
The position and velocity for each randomly generated Monte Carlo trajectory needs to
be stored in memory and later used to calculate mean and covariance along the path. The
sampling period used in the aircraft model is Ts = 0.01. The simulation time is dependent
on the scenario, but Tf = 60 seconds can be considered a reasonable look-ahead time. The
number of samples along the path is therefore NS = TfTs = 6000.
If, for example, 12,000 Monte Carlo simulations are performed in a given scenario, the
amount of samples that require storage is 12,000×6000 = 72 million samples, and that is
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Table 4.1: Memory Usage Requirements for 12,000 Monte Carlo Simulations with Ts = 0.01 and
Tf = 60
Variable Dimensions Instances Memory Usage∗
Position 6000 × 3 12,000 6000×3×12,000×8 ≈ 1.61 GB
Velocity 6000 × 3 12,000 6000×3×12,000×8 ≈ 1.61 GB
Mean Position 6000 × 3 1 6000×3×1×8 ≈ 141 KB
Mean Velocity 6000 × 3 1 6000×3×1×8 ≈ 141 KB
Position Covariance 18,000 × 3 1 18,000×3×1×8 ≈ 422 KB
Velocity Covariance 18,000 × 3 1 18,000×3×1×8 ≈ 422 KB
∗ All variables are stored in double-precision format i.e. 8 bytes per value.
only for a one-dimensional variable. The basic memory requirements for a single scenario
are set out in table 4.1.
In MATLAB, the hold function was initially used to accumulate data in memory after
each simulation. By default, MATLAB stores floating-point numbers in double-precision
format, meaning that each number is designated 64-bits (8 bytes) of memory. According
to table 4.1, approximately 3.23 GB of memory is required in total.
The computer used for this thesis uses the Windows 7 32-bit operating system with 4
GB of available RAM. The version of MATLAB (R2008a) used allows for a maximum
array size of 1281 Megabytes (MB) with a total space of 1566 MB for all arrays. There
is therefore insufficient RAM for even the most basic scenario containing only a single
aircraft.
To work around this problem, the software was adapted in such a way that every Monte
Carlo simulation is stored in a delimited text file – one for velocity and one for position.
When the mean and covariance is calculated, simulations are loaded one at a time and
subsequently cleared from memory. Unfortunately, this slowed down execution consider-
ably. The software was then once again adapted to use binary files instead of text files,
allowing data to be stored in a specified precision format without delimiters and white
space characters that cause a bottleneck in the read-write process.
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4.5 Probability Flow
Following the introductory discussion in section 2.6.5 on page 27, this section presents the
mathematical definition and software implementation of the algorithm.
4.5.1 Definition of a Tight Upper Bound
Recall from section 2.6.5 on page 27 that probability flow is the instantaneous rate of
increase in the probability of conflict experienced when a vehicle state PDF is propagated
through a conflict region surface boundary. Jones describes how a vehicle’s state PDF
distorts during the risk accumulation process through the conflict region (see figure 2.6),
increasing the complexity of the problem.
The state PDF is therefore assumed to be unchanged with each encounter with the con-
flict region. This results in the repeated accumulation of risk and an upper bound to
the overall probability of conflict. This is achieved by not only considering the set of
trajectories at time t, which have not experienced conflict previously, but rather the set
of all trajectories in the sample space whether they have earlier experienced conflict or not.
Van Daalen points out that the upper bound will be tight at or below typical threshold
values. This is because the size of the upper bound is proportional to the amount of accu-
mulated risk. Particularly, in civil aviation, conflict probability thresholds are extremely
low, meaning that for a small predicted risks of conflict, the upper bound will be small or
negligible. Kuchar and Yang speculate that a worst-case accuracy of 5% is necessary to
differentiate between conflict and no conflict [2].
The definition of the upper bound to the flow of probability in a 3D sample space Ω is
defined by Van Daalen as
dPUBC (t)
dt = −
ˆˆ
S(Ct)
fR(t)(p)
ˆ wn(p,t)
−∞
fVn(t) (vn|Dpt ) vn dvn dS. (4.5.1)
The full derivation can be found in [13]. Understanding the role of each term in the ex-
pression is key to understanding the equation as a whole. Stochastic variables denoted by
R(t, ω) and V(t, ω) describe the vehicle position and velocity states respectively over the
interval [t0, t] for ω ∈ Ω. The PDF of R(t, ω) given that no conflict condition exists at
position variable p is therefore fR(t)(p).
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The unit normal vector pointing away from the conflict region surface S is denoted by n.
The normal component of V(t, ω) can then be calculated as Vn(t, ω) , n·V(t, ω).
Dpt is the set of outcomes over [t0, t] for which R(t, ω) is at position p. The PDF of Vn(t, ω)
at velocity variable vn given Dpt is therefore fVn(t) (vn|Dpt ).
The velocity of point p over [t0, t] is denoted by w(p, t). The upper limit of the inner velo-
city integral in equation 4.5.1 on the previous page is then the normal velocity component
of point p calculated as wn(p, t) , n(p)·w(p, t).
Now that an understanding of the different terms in equation 4.5.1 on the preceding page
has been established, the method of solving this equation can be discussed. The first step
is to assume that the probability distributions of the aircraft position and velocity states
are jointly Gaussian.
 V(t, ω)
R(t, ω)
 ∼

 V(t)
R(t)
 ,
 CV(t, t) CVR(t, t)
CTVR(t, t) CR(t, t)

 (4.5.2)
Van Daalen then shows that the inner velocity integral of equation 4.5.1 on the previous
page can be calculated as
− σV (t)√
2pi
exp
−
(
ωn(p, t)− V n(t)
)2
2σ2V (t)
+ 12V n(t) erfc
(
V n(t)− ωn(p, t)√
2σV (t)
)
, (4.5.3)
where the mean normal velocity is
V n(t) = nT
(
V(t) + CVR(t, t)CR−1(t, t)
(
p−R(t)
))
(4.5.4)
and the velocity variance is
σ2V (t) = nT
(
CV(t, t)−CVR(t, t)CR−1(t, t)CVRT (t, t)
)
n (4.5.5)
at point p on the interval [t0, t]. The probability of conflict can then be calculated from
equation 4.5.1 on the preceding page as
PUBC (tf ) =
ˆ tf
t0
dPUBC (τ)
dτ dτ. (4.5.6)
4.5.2 Summary of Assumptions
The method described by Van Daalen conforms to the following assumptions:
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• PC(τ) is absolutely continuous on the interval [t0, tf ].
• The instantaneous probability of conflict at t0 is negligible. This is important to
note because the proposed system must be initialised in a conflict-free situation.
• The probability distributions of the aircraft position and velocity states is jointly
Gaussian.
• The aircraft state PDF is unchanged with each encounter with the conflict region.
4.5.3 Adaptive Integration
To efficiently calculate the surface integral in equation 4.5.1 and the time integral in
equation 4.5.6, Van Daalen proposes the use of adaptive numerical integration. Adaptive
integration, also known as adaptive quadrature, is a method of estimating the value of a
definite integral by partitioning the integration domain and then recursively refining only
those partitions where the estimate of the integration error is above a certain threshold
[13]. An integration rule is used to estimate the value of the integral over each partition.
The pseudocode given in algorithm 2 demonstrates how adaptive integration is performed
using recursion.
Algorithm 2 Recursive Adaptive Integration Algorithm
1: function adaptiveIntegration(domain, domain_integral)
2: partition domain into smaller sections
3: for each section do
4: section_integral = evaluate integration rule
5: section_error = calculate error estimate
6: if section_error > error threshold then
7: adaptiveIntegration(section, domain_integral)
8: else
9: domain_integral = domain_integral + section_integral
10: end if
11: end for
12: return domain_integral
13: end function
Both in practice and in simulation, the flight data collected from the aircraft model is
uniformly discrete. A family of numerical integration rules called Newton-Cotes formu-
las is therefore most appropriate for adaptive quadrature. Contrary to Gaussian-based
quadrature rules, Newton-Cotes formulas facilitate the estimation of integrals sampled at
equally-spaced intervals. [52]
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From the Newton-Cotes family, Van Daalen suggests the use of the midpoint rule for the
surface integration in equation 4.5.1 and Simpson’s rule for the time integration in equa-
tion 4.5.6.
The surface being integrated is that of the conflict region described by a polygon mesh of
triangles. The integral over a triangle surface in 3D-space is approximated as the product
between the area of the triangle and the value of the integrand at the triangle’s centroid.
Referring to figure 4.12, the midpoint rule is then
QM(p0,p1,p2)f = A(p0,p1,p2)f (c0) , (4.5.7)
where A(p0,p1,p2) is the area of the triangle with vertices p0, p1 and p2 and c0 is the
centroid of the triangle. The centroid is calculated using c0 = 13(p0 + p1 + p2). The area
is calculated using A(p0,p1,p2) = 12 |(p0 − p1)× (p0 − p2)|.
p1
p0
p2p4
p5
p3
c0
c1
c2
c3
Figure 4.12: Diagram illustrating the Midpoint Rule
To determine an estimate of the error required in the adaptive integration process, the
triangle is divided into 4 congruent triangles as shown in figure 4.12. The additional
vertices are now defined at p3 = 12(p0 + p1), p4 =
1
2(p0 + p2) and p5 =
1
2(p1 + p2). The
integration rule is then applied to each of the 4 smaller triangles and the resulting values
are summed. The error estimate is then the difference between the integration estimate
over the large triangle and the sum of the estimates over the smaller triangles.
EM(p0,p1,p2)f =
∣∣∣QM(p0,p1,p2)f − (QM(p0,p3,p4)f +QM(p1,p3,p5) +QM(p2,p4,p5) +QM(p3,p4,p5))∣∣∣
(4.5.8)
Because the triangle with vertices p3, p4 and p5 has the same centroid as the large triangle,
it can be said that QM(p3,p4,p5)f =
1
4Q
M
(p0,p1,p2)f . Equation 4.5.8 can therefore be written
as
EM(p0,p1,p2)f =
∣∣∣∣34QM(p0,p1,p2)f −QM(p0,p3,p4)f −QM(p1,p3,p5) −QM(p2,p4,p5)
∣∣∣∣ . (4.5.9)
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If EM(p0,p1,p2)f is above a specified error threshold, each of the smaller triangles can then
be divided into 4 even smaller congruent triangles. The integration estimates for each
of those triangles is then calculated to obtain a more accurate estimate of the original
integral as well as a lower error estimate. The process can be repeated until the error
estimate shrinks to below the threshold. A minimum triangle size can also be specified to
terminate the recursion.
A discussion now follows for the calculation of the time integral in equation 4.5.6 using
Simpson’s rule. Simpson’s rule is defined for an integral with integrand f(· ) on the
interval [a, b] as
QS[a,b]f =
b− a
6
[
f(a) + 4f
(
a+ b
2
)
+ f(b)
]
. (4.5.10)
Simpson’s rule approximates the integrand by fitting a quadratic polynomial through 3
equally-spaced points (depicted in figure 4.13). The bounds of the initial interval [a, b]
make up two of these points. The third point is the midpoint of the interval, which is
calculated using c = a+b2 .
a c = a+b2 b
f(x)
g(x)
Figure 4.13: Diagram illustrating Simpson’s Rule
The error between the true value of the integral and the estimate obtained using Simpson’s
rule is given by ˆ a
b
f(x)dx−QS[a,b]f =
1
90
(
b− a
2
)5 ∣∣∣f (4)(ξ)∣∣∣ (4.5.11)
where ξ ∈ [a, b]. The first step in estimating this error is to evaluate Simpson’s rule over
both halves of the partitioned domain i.e. [a, c] and [c, b]. The sum of these estimates
is regarded as the best approximation of the integral over [a, b]. The error can then be
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calculated using
ES[a,b]f = |QS[a,b]f − (QS[a,c]f +QS[c,b]f)|. (4.5.12)
As with the midpoint rule, if ES[a,b]f is larger than a predefined error threshold, the integ-
ration domain is further refined to obtain a more accurate approximation of the integral.
The process is repeated until the error estimate is below the threshold. A minimum inter-
val size can also be specified to abort the refinement process.
As proposed by Van Daalen, error thresholds, which are proportional to the time integra-
tion interval length or surface integration triangle size are used in this thesis.
4.5.4 Code
Original MATLAB code for a 2D 2-aeroplane scenario and a 3D autonomous underwa-
ter vehicle (AUV) scenario was provided by Van Daalen for reference in this thesis. In
addition, a C implementation of the probability flow algorithm coupled with a Python
interface was included with the 3D example scenario.
The structure of Van Daalen’s implementation is set up in such a way that all vehicle
and modelling data is pre-defined in MATLAB. The mean and covariance of the AUV
position and velocity is found by performing Monte Carlo simulation with a simple linear
state-space model using the lsim function. The conflict region is assumed to have already
undergone Minkowski addition. The MATLAB data is stored in .mat files and read by a
Python script, which executes a function call to the C program to calculate the probability
of conflict.
The provided MATLAB code was studied in order to gain an understanding of the al-
gorithm, but only the C code is reused in this thesis. The latest version of the GNU
Compiler Collection (GCC) has removed an option -mno -cygwin from the C compiler,
but the distutils Python package used for creating C extensions has not yet removed
the deprecated option. As a result, incompatibility issues arose when attempting the re-
compile Van Daalen’s example code. Finding an older version of GCC is a possibility that
was explored, but the -mno -cygwin option has also been removed from all previous
versions of GCC.
The solution was therefore to remove the Python interface between MATLAB and the
probability flow C function. This required the adaptation of the C code and the imple-
mentation of a mex function to provide the communication link between the two platforms.
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Once the code was adapted, it was tested with Van Daalen’s 3D scenario initialisation in
MATLAB to ensure that the existing results could be replicated.
4.6 Accumulating Risk for Multiple Conflicts
In the event of multiple detected conflicts along a predicted trajectory, the net risk along
the path must be calculated. Because it is possible for conflict events to occur simultan-
eously, it can be said that conflict events are not mutually exclusive. The net risk can
therefore not be found by simply adding together the individual probabilities of conflict
along the path. The net risk must calculated by finding the probability that at least 1
conflict event occurs. This is in essence the probability of the union of all conflict events.
PCT = P
NO⋃
k=1
Ck
 (4.6.1)
The net risk along the predicted trajectory is denoted by PCT andNO is the total number of
obstacles including intruder aircraft, terrain, weather or protected airspace. The inclusion-
exclusion principle stated in equation 4.6.2 [53] for NO ≥ 2 can be used to determine PCT .
P
NO⋃
k=1
Ck
 = NO∑
m=1
(−1)m−1 ∑
K⊂{1,...,NO}
|K|=m
P
 ⋂
k∈K
Ck

 (4.6.2)
The last sum in the equation continues over all subsets K containing exactly m elements.
In more general form, it can be written out as
P
NO⋃
k=1
Ck
 = NO∑
k=1
PCk −
∑
k<l
P (Ck ∩ Cl) +
∑
k<l<m
P (Ck ∩ Cl ∩ Cm)− . . .
+ (−1)NO−1P
NO⋂
k=1
Ck
 .
(4.6.3)
For 2 conflict events, C1 and C2, this is simple to compute.
PCT = P (C1 ∪ C2) = PC1 + PC2 − P (C1 ∩ C2) (4.6.4)
The principle is, however, demonstrated more clearly with 3 events.
PCT = P (C1 ∪ C2 ∪ C3)
= PC1 + PC2 + PC3 − P (C1 ∩ C2)− P (C1 ∩ C3)− P (C2 ∩ C3)
+ P (C1 ∩ C2 ∩ C3)
(4.6.5)
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Figure 4.14: Venn Diagrams for Illustration of the Inclusion-Exclusion Principle
The Venn diagrams in figure 4.14 illustrate the union of 3 conflict events at 3 different
stages of the inclusion-exclusion process. The numbers indicated in each circle section
represent the number of times the associated portion of risk is accumulated.
In this thesis, it is assumed that the occurrence of a conflict does not influence the likelihood
of an additional conflict occurrence. Conflict events are therefore said to be independent
of one another. The probability of the intersection of conflict events can accordingly be
calculated by multiplying the individual conflict probabilities.
P
NO⋂
k=1
Ck
 = NO∏
k=1
PCk (4.6.6)
From equation 4.6.3, it is observed that calculating the net probability of conflict becomes
a cumbersome process for many conflict events. Algorithm 3 demonstrates how the process
is streamlined using recursion.
Algorithm 3 Recursive Inclusion-Exclusion Algorithm
1: function multipleProbUnion(probvec)
2: if length(probvec) == 1 then
3: return probvec
4: else
5: a = probvec(1)
6: b = multipleProbUnion(probvec(2:length(probvec)))
7: return a + b − (a ∗ b)
8: end if
9: end function
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When the principle of inclusion-exclusion is used with upper bounded probabilities cal-
culated using probability flow, an upper bound is also expected on the net probability of
conflict. The net risk will, however, have no upper bound if an upper bound is not present
on any of the individual conflict probabilities along the predicted trajectory.
This concept can be explained by first defining the overestimate on a probability of conflict
as
∆PCk = PUBCk − PCk (4.6.7)
where k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , NO}, PUBCk is an upper bounded conflict probability and PCk is the
true probability of conflict obtained through Monte Carlo simulation. When the net risk
is calculated using upper bounded probabilities, equation 4.6.1 becomes
PUBCT = P
UB
NO⋃
k=1
Ck
 . (4.6.8)
In order for there to be an upper bound on the net probability of conflict, the probability
of the union of all conflict probability overestimates must be larger than 0. From the defin-
ition of the union, it can be concluded that there will always be a non-zero overestimate
on the net probability of conflict provided that an upper bound is present on at least 1
conflict probability along the path. The overestimate can also never be larger than the
sum of all individual conflict probability overestimates.
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Chapter 5
Simulations and Results
The Monte Carlo and probability flow methods are implemented in 4 key simulation scen-
arios. A description of each scenario’s implementation, the motivation behind their selec-
tion and the results of each simulation are presented in this chapter. The performance of
the probability flow method is observed in the civil aviation context and compared to a
“ground-truth” result obtained through Monte Carlo simulation.
5.1 Scenario 1: Two-Aeroplane Example
This scenario is an adaptation of a well-known conflict detection example first introduced
by Paielli and Erzberger [14], and later also used by Yang et al. [2], Jones [26] and Van
Daalen [13]. While these authors present an implementation for the two-dimensional case,
this thesis presents the scenario in three-dimensions where both aircraft are flying at the
same altitude. The scenario is not repeated here in two-dimensions because probability
flow has already been proven by Van Daalen to perform this scenario more efficiently and
with the least error in comparison with the other methods [13]. This scenario is, however,
implemented in 3D to demonstrate that probability flow is capable of predicting a simple
mid-air collision as adequately as TCAS would be able to.
In this flight scenario, the host aircraft is flying straight-and-level at a constant velocity
of 240 knots (123.5 m/s) East while a single intruder flies straight-and-level at 240 knots
North. The aircraft is simulated under autopilot conditions with a medium turbulence
disturbance setting. The aircraft starting positions are staggered, which results in a near-
miss collision and a potential violation in safe separation criteria.
A conceptual diagram of the scenario initialisation is shown in figure 5.1 on the next page.
The radius of both the host and intruder aircraft conflict regions is chosen to be equival-
ent to the 60 metre wingspan of an Airbus A330 aircraft. The Monte Carlo simulation of
the host and intruder aircraft is performed separately for NMC = 12,000. This number
was chosen to be sufficiently large to ensure a negligible margin of uncertainty on the
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Figure 5.1: Two-Aeroplane Example Conceptual Diagram
“ground-truth” result, but also sufficiently small so as to avoid unnecessarily large data
files. Figure 5.2 shows 50 Monte Carlo trajectories (limited for display purposes) for the
host and intruder aircraft.
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Figure 5.2: Monte Carlo Simulation of Two-Aeroplane Scenario
The relative Monte Carlo trajectories of the intruder to the host are calculated by sub-
tracting each point along the host’s path from each point along the intruder’s path cor-
responding in time for each simulation. The resulting trajectories are shown in figure 5.3
on the following page.
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Figure 5.3: Scenario 1: Top-View of Relative Monte Carlo Trajectories
The red dot at the origin represents the combined spherical conflict regions of the host and
intruder aircraft. The number of relative trajectory intersections with the sphere divided
by the total number of Monte Carlo simulations (12,000) is the probability of conflict PC .
The probability of conflict and associated uncertainty for the two-aeroplane scenario for
a look-ahead time of 60 seconds is given in table 5.1. The execution times of both Monte
Carlo and probability flow methods are provided, but cannot be realistically compared as
they are implemented on two different platforms, MATLAB and C respectively. Execution
time would no doubt be improved with code optimisation, parallel processing and a faster
computer. It should however be noted that the probability flow algorithm executes in only
0.56 seconds even without any efficiency improvements.
Table 5.1: Two-Aircraft Scenario Simulation Results
Method PC (%) Error∗ (%) Uncertainty† (%) Running Time (s)
Monte Carlo 12.433 - 0.903 94040.85
Probability Flow 12.621 0.188 0.503 0.56
∗ compared to Monte Carlo simulation
† 3 × standard deviation for Monte Carlo, total estimated integration error for probab-
ility flow
Van Daalen postulates that if the algorithm’s execution time is less than 100 ms, then
the algorithm can be said to execute in real-time. This scenario therefore clearly does not
meet this requirement. This is attributed to the 0.01 second sampling period required by
the aircraft model paired with a look-ahead time of 60 seconds, resulting in a vast number
of samples. Figure 5.4 on the next page depicts the effect of varying the sampling period
on the execution time and accuracy of probability flow.
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Figure 5.4: Scenario 1: Effect of Sampling Period on Execution Time and Probability of Conflict
The execution time does indeed decrease for larger sampling periods, but the loss of ac-
curacy is severe. The PUBC deviation is defined as the variation of the probability of
conflict calculated using probability flow from the most accurate obtained value. In figure
5.4(b), this is the deviation from PUBC calculated with a 0.01 second sampling period.
With sampling periods larger than 0.2 seconds, it can be seen that almost zero conflict is
detected. The duration of the conflict between the host and intruder aircraft is therefore
extremely small, only 1.2 seconds as seen in figure 5.5, and is undetected between larger
sampling periods. This is possible with scenarios in which aircraft are travelling at high
speeds, the conflict is very slight and the duration of conflict is minuscule. For this scen-
ario, it is therefore recommended that the sampling period be kept at 0.01 seconds. It
may be possible, however, to increase the sampling period to achieve a quicker execution
time in scenarios near airports where aircraft travel at lower speeds.
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Figure 5.5: Scenario 1: Accumulation of Risk over Time
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From table 5.1, an overestimate of 0.188 % is obtained on the probability of conflict. How-
ever, there is uncertainty of σMC = 0.301 % on the probability of conflict calculated with
Monte Carlo simulation as well as an error estimate of EM (surface) + ES(time) = 0.503
% on the probability of conflict calculated with the probability flow method. According
to the 3σ-rule, it can therefore be said that 99.73 % of the true probability of conflict lies
on the interval [11.53, 13.336] % and the upper bound to the probability of conflict lies on
the interval [12.118, 12.809] %. Consequently, the possible error on the true probability of
conflict lies on the interval [0, 1.279] %.
In scenarios like the two-aeroplane example where the host aircraft and the conflict region
diverge quickly after a conflict occurs, the overestimate on the probability of conflict will
be very small or non-existent. This is because repeated accumulation of risk does not
occur as it does in scenarios where the host aircraft is exposed to the conflict region for
longer periods of time. The overestimate on the probability of conflict in this scenario is
consequently not large enough to influence a resolution decision.
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Figure 5.6: Scenario 1: Convergence of PC with increasing values of NMC
In figure 5.6, the convergence of the probability of conflict for both Monte Carlo and prob-
ability flow methods is plotted for increasing values of NMC . From this, it is confirmed
that the probability of conflict indeed becomes more accurate and less uncertain as the
number of simulations tends to infinity. The upper bound to the probability of conflict,
however, has a relatively consistent error bound over NMC simulations because the integ-
ration error thresholds are adjusted relative to NMC for each simulation.
Although probability flow does not execute in real-time according to Van Daalen’s 100 ms
criterion, the method still executes in under 1 second. To the author’s knowledge, there
is no published measurement of the speed at which TCAS can detect a conflict, only that
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surveillance updates are performed once per second. According to Kuchar and Drumm
[54], pilots normally take 5 to 15 seconds to react to an RA after initially receiving the
warning. It can therefore be concluded that probability flow is a viable method for this
type of scenario, allowing at least 59 seconds for a resolution manoeuvre.
5.2 Scenario 2: Terrain Only
This scenario consists of a single host aircraft descending slowly through a valley for 42
seconds. This is a realistic example because the particular valley chosen contains the Paro
airport in Bhutan, at the eastern end of the Himalayas. This scenario was chosen to test
if probability flow can predict CFIT accidents similarly to EGPWS in a dangerous airport
environment. A Google map and corresponding top-view mesh of the terrain is shown in
figure 5.7.
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Figure 5.7: Terrain Maps of Paro, Bhutan Airport
The simulation is initialised with the host aircraft at a position of 4.85 km North and
0 km East at an altitude of 2.48 km in the inertial axis system. The target velocity is
specified to start at 154 knots and uniformly decelerate to 150 knots along the path. Once
again, Monte Carlo simulation is performed for NMC = 12,000 under medium turbulence
conditions.
To speed up computation time, the mesh faces that lie outside 3 standard deviations of
the mean Monte Carlo trajectory are discarded. This margin is chosen to correspond with
the 3σ-rule, which states that nearly all values (99.73 %) lie within 3 standard deviations
of the mean in a normal distribution. Figure 5.8 on the next page depicts the first step in
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the mesh reduction process.
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Figure 5.8: Scenario 2: Mesh Reduction to Decrease Computation Time
The second step, is the simplification of the mesh by approximating areas of low detail
with larger triangle faces. This is achieved through the use of the reducepatch function
in MATLAB. The function attempts to reduce the number of mesh faces to a specified
percentage of the initial number while still preserving the overall shape of the original
object. The reducepatch function must, however, be used with caution as reducing the
mesh too much will result in a severe loss of accuracy.
With regards to probability flow, the ideal integration error threshold range for this scen-
ario must first be calculated before the optimal mesh reduction factor can be determined.
This is because the surface and time integration error thresholds are chosen to be in-
versely proportional to the number of triangles in the terrain mesh. Figure 5.9 on the
following page shows the effect of varying the surface integration error threshold on the
interval [1.077 × 10−7, 0.1077] and the time integration error threshold on the interval
[5.3848× 10−10, 5.3848× 10−4].
The time integration error threshold is kept constant in figure 5.9(a) while the surface
integration error threshold is kept constant in 5.9(b). The corresponding integration error
estimates are therefore approximately constant meaning that any disparity in the total
estimate of uncertainty is primarily due to the variable threshold in question.
From figure 5.9(a) on the next page, it is decided that an execution time below 2 seconds
is desirable while the total estimate of uncertainty on the upper bound to the probabil-
ity of conflict should be kept below 0.5 %. The ideal surface integration error threshold
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Figure 5.9: Scenario 2: Effect of Integration Error Thresholds on Execution Time and Uncertainty
range is therefore on the interval [1.77×10−5, 7.8131×10−5], shown in grey on figure 5.9(a).
Looking at figure 5.9(b), it is observed that varying the time integration error threshold
has little effect on both execution time and total uncertainty. This is likely due to the tight
sampling period of 0.01 seconds in the aircraft model. The threshold is therefore chosen
to be 5.3848× 10−6 where the execution time appears to flatten out below 2 seconds.
The effect of varying mesh reduction factors can now be observed in figures 5.10 and 5.11
on the next page. Due to the inverse proportionality of the number of triangles to the
integration error thresholds, the surface integration error threshold is chosen as 1.77×10−5
on the lower side of the ideal spectrum, leaving room for the threshold to increase as the
number of triangles is decreased.
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Figure 5.10: Scenario 2: Effect of Mesh Reduction on Execution Time, Uncertainty and PUBC
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In figure 5.10(a) on the preceding page, an expected decrease in computation time is ob-
served as well as a slight increase in uncertainty for large percentages of mesh reduction.
In figure 5.10(b), a large deviation in the upper bound to the probability of conflict can be
seen for a mesh reduction between 80 % and 100 %. This is important to note because the
oversimplification of a mesh could underestimate the surface integration error and thus
underestimate the overall probability of conflict.
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Figure 5.11: Scenario 2: Effect of Mesh Reduction on Surface Area and Maximum Triangle Size
Van Daalen recommends that the maximum size of mesh triangles therefore be constrained
by the smallest singular value of the covariance matrix of the aircraft position PDF [13].
This ensures that significant amounts of probability flow are not missed due to an excessive
distance between the aircraft position distribution on the mesh surface and any triangle
centroid. For this scenario, a mesh reduction of at most 78 % can be performed, resulting
in at most an underestimate of 0.2452 % on PCUBC and a maximum triangle size of 11705
m2. Probability flow can therefore be optimally executed in 0.39 seconds for this scenario.
The results are shown in table 5.2.
Table 5.2: Terrain Only Scenario Simulation Results (first iteration)
Method PC (%) Error∗ (%) Uncertainty† (%) Running Time (s)
Monte Carlo 2.25 - 0.405 57442.44
Probability Flow 4.346 2.096 0.0929 0.39
∗ compared to Monte Carlo simulation
† 3 × standard deviation for Monte Carlo, total estimated integration error for probab-
ility flow
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Figure 5.12: Scenario 2: Accumulation of Risk over Time
The overestimate of 2.096 % on a Monte Carlo probability of conflict of 2.25 % is a large
error on such a small probability. To obtain a clearer understanding of the problem, the
simulation was therefore repeated with the planned trajectory of the host moved closer to
the right-hand side of the valley, resulting in a higher risk of conflict. The results can be
seen in table 5.3.
Table 5.3: Terrain Only Scenario Simulation Results (second iteration)
Method PC (%) Error∗ (%) Uncertainty† (%) Running Time (s)
Monte Carlo 23.61 - 1.164 47863.59
Probability Flow 42.361 18.751 0.0584 0.56
∗ compared to Monte Carlo simulation
† 3 × standard deviation for Monte Carlo, total estimated integration error for probab-
ility flow
Once again, a large overestimate on the probability of conflict is present. It is suspected
that this is because the host aircraft flies parallel to the mountain in this scenario, resulting
in long exposure to the conflict region. To understand this effect, the perpendicular and
parallel flow of probability through obstacles is compared.
5.2.1 Flow Perpendicular to Obstacles
As already confirmed in the two-aeroplane example, when an aircraft meets an obstacle
head-on (perpendicularly), the overestimate on the probability of conflict obtained through
the probability flow method will be very small or non-existent. This is because after the
aircraft position and velocity PDF has been distorted, it moves further into the conflict
region. The intersection surface area between the PDF and the conflict region therefore
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remains approximately the same. The concept is demonstrated graphically in figure 5.13.
t2
accumulate probability flow
t3
distorted state PDF
t2
probability removed
Figure 5.13: Tight Upper Bound for Perpendicular Probability Flow
The movement of the vehicle state PDF towards the conflict region is not shown in the
figure, but occurs at t1. At t2, the PDF is propagated into the conflict region. The flow
of probability is accumulated across the conflict region boundary and removed from the
PDF. The PDF is therefore distorted at t3. The PDF tries to return to Gaussian form by
shifting some outcomes into the empty space created by the removal of probability, but
the distortion moves the boundary of contact away from the conflict region, decreasing
the surface area across which probability is accumulated.
However, at this same instance, the distorted PDF is propagated further into the conflict
region. This moves the boundary of contact towards the conflict region again, increasing
the accumulation surface area. The resulting surface area is therefore roughly equivalent
at t2 and t3 or negligibly smaller at t3, as shown in red. If the rate of probability increase
is measured across the same contact area over time, the PDF can then be assumed un-
changed with each iteration of propagation.
To test this theory outright, a simple scenario in which the host aircraft flies perpendicu-
larly into the conflict region (a flat wall) at 240 knots is simulated. The wall is chosen to
be smaller than 2 standard deviations of the mean Monte Carlo trajectory to ensure that
the true probability of conflict is not 100 %, so that any overestimate obtained through
probability flow can be observed. The results are shown in table 5.4 on the following page.
From the results, it can be clearly seen that the error of -0.049 % is extremely small.
With a standard deviation of 0.388 % on the Monte Carlo probability of conflict, the true
probability of conflict lies on the interval [22.561, 24.889] and the probability of conflict
calculated using probability flow is on the interval [23.6196, 23.7324]. The overestimate
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Table 5.4: Perpendicular Conflict Simulation Results
Method PC (%) Error∗ (%) Uncertainty† (%) Running Time (s)
Monte Carlo 23.725 - 1.164 7252.65
Probability Flow 23.676 -0.049 0.0564 2.05
∗ compared to Monte Carlo simulation
† 3 × standard deviation for Monte Carlo, total estimated integration error for probab-
ility flow
to the probability of conflict therefore lies on the interval [0, 1.1566] %. A maximum
overestimate of 1.1566 % is very small and therefore confirms the theory. It should be
noted that the execution time of 2.05 seconds is larger here than in the scenario initially
presented in this section because no mesh optimisation techniques were performed on the
wall.
5.2.2 Flow Parallel to Obstacles
Using figure 5.14, the effect of flying closely parallel to an obstacle on the accumulation
of probability flow can be explained. After moving towards the conflict region at t1, the
aircraft state PDF experiences conflict at t2. At this same instant, probability flow is
accumulated and removed from the PDF. Once again, the PDF tries to return itself to the
shape of a Gaussian distribution, but the PDF is left distorted nonetheless.
t2 t3t2
initial conflict probability removed distorted PDF vs unchanged PDF
Figure 5.14: Overestimate for Parallel Probability Flow
At t3, the PDF is not propagated further into the conflict region, nor does it diverge.
Flying parallel to the conflict region results in the repeated distortion of the aircraft state
PDF over time at the same point of contact. This creates a smaller intersection surface
between the aircraft state PDF and the conflict region after each time step of propagation
(shown in red). If it is assumed that the aircraft state PDF remains unchanged with
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each encounter with the conflict region (shown as dotted), probability flow is accumulated
across a greater contact area than it should be, resulting in a very large overestimate on
the probability of conflict. The magnitude of the overestimate is dependent on the shape
of the terrain and duration of conflict.
A simple scenario to demonstrate this concept was performed for a host aircraft flying
straight-and-level at 240 knots parallel to a wall. The results of this scenario are shown in
table 5.5.
Table 5.5: Parallel Conflict Simulation Results
Method PC (%) Error∗ (%) Uncertainty† (%) Running Time (s)
Monte Carlo 2.508 - 0.429 7687.5
Probability Flow 8.308 5.8 0.0842 2.17
∗ compared to Monte Carlo simulation
† 3 × standard deviation for Monte Carlo, total estimated integration error for probab-
ility flow
An error of 5.8 % is calculated on the probability of conflict using probability flow – a
large overestimate on a probability of only 2.508 %. The true probability of conflict lies
on the interval [2.079, 2.937] % while the upper bound to the probability of conflict lies
on the interval [8.2238, 8.3922] %. The possible overestimate on the probability of conflict
calculated is therefore bounded by the interval [5.2868, 6.3132] %.
Because the overestimate is relative to the magnitude of risk, large probabilities of conflict
will be accompanied by extremely large upper bounds. A large overestimate in this case
would, however, not influence a resolution decision as evasive action would be required re-
gardless. For small detected probabilities of conflict, a relatively large overestimate would
make the difference between risk being below the alert threshold or above it. For example,
in the results of table 5.5, a risk of 2.508 % would fall below a threshold of 5 % not
warranting an alert, whereas the risk of 8.308 % calculated using probability flow would
unnecessarily trigger a traffic advisory to the pilot.
From the information gathered in this section, it can be concluded that flying closely
parallel to obstacle conflict regions leads to the over-accumulation of probability flow. This
type of scenario is unlikely, but potentially very hazardous. It could, however, lead to false
alarms near airports that operate parallel runways. This is also a common problem with
TCAS for runway separations closer than 3000 ft [55]. As a solution, it may be possible
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to use a linear combination of smaller Gaussian functions to represent the aircraft state
PDF as a basis function. Propagation and accumulation of risk for a distorted state PDF
can therefore be performed by instead propagating the individual Gaussian functions that
make up the distorted PDF and accumulating risk from only those Gaussian functions that
experience conflict. This solution is discussed in further detail in section 6.3 in chapter 5.
5.3 Scenario 3: Multiple Intruders and Terrain
Following the independent testing of the the probability flow algorithm in scenario 1 and 2
for a simple mid-air collision and CFIT collision respectively, the algorithm is applied to an
example containing both of these aspects. The host aircraft in this scenario flies closely over
the Margalla Hills near the Benazir Bhutto international airport, in Islamabad, Pakistan.
This scenario was chosen in consideration of the Airblue flight 202 CFIT accident that
occurred in the Margalla Hills in 2010. Additionally, two intruder aircraft closely crossing
paths with the host aircraft are added to the simulation. If TCAS and EGPWS are to be
replaced with a single system, potential new algorithms such as probability flow, should
be evaluated on their ability to predict conflict with both terrain and multiple aircraft.
The scenario trajectories are depicted in figure 5.15 along with a Google map of the area.
Map data ©2014 Google
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Figure 5.15: Terrain Maps of Margalla Hills, Islamabad
The host aircraft starts flying at 2.68 kilometres North and 4.2885 kilometres East at an
altitude of 930 metres above sea level. The aircraft passes closely by a steep peak in the
Margalla Hills at 12.5 seconds into the simulation before descending at an average velocity
of 143 knots towards the airport. The first intruder aircraft crosses paths perpendicularly
above the host aircraft 19.5 seconds into the simulation at a velocity of 140 knots. The
second intruder aircraft crosses paths just below the host aircraft 20.25 seconds into the
simulation at a velocity of 140 knots. A three-dimensional view of the scenario can be
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seen in figure 5.16.
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Figure 5.16: Scenario 3: 3D-View of Terrain and Aircraft Trajectories
Before applying any mesh reduction techniques, the effect of varying the surface integration
error threshold ESTH over the interval [2.3191 × 10−8, 2.3191 × 10−5] is measured (shown
in figure 5.17). It can be clearly seen that changing the threshold has little effect on the
uncertainty estimate for each calculated probability of conflict in this scenario, but the exe-
cution time of each calculation is significantly reduced for 5×10−7 ≤ ESTH ≤ 2.3191×10−5.
Varying the time integration error threshold produces no significant effect on the uncer-
tainty estimate or execution time and is therefore not shown here. This is once again due
to the small sampling period used in simulation, ensuring negligible error between time
samples.
As in scenario 2, when the probability flow method is implemented, only those mesh faces
that lie within 3 standard deviations of the mean Monte Carlo trajectory are checked for
conflict. Mesh reduction is also employed with insight from figures 5.18 and 5.19.
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Figure 5.17: Scenario 3: Effect of Surface Integration Error Threshold on Execution Time and
Uncertainty
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Figure 5.18: Scenario 3: Effect of Mesh Reduction on Execution Time, Uncertainty and PUBC
Figure 5.18(a) shows the expected decline in execution time for large mesh reduction
factors with a slight increase in total uncertainty. The upper bound to the probability of
conflict also shows significant deviation for a mesh reduction between 79 and 100 %. Mesh
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Figure 5.19: Scenario 3: Effect of Mesh Reduction on Surface Area and Maximum Triangle Size
reduction is therefore kept to 78 % resulting in an execution time of 0.68 seconds and a
maximum triangle size of 15,561 m2.
Table 5.6: Multiple Intruders and Terrain Simulation Results
PC (%) Error∗ (%) Uncertainty† (%) Running Time (s)
Terrain
Monte Carlo 2.8 - 0.4518 57988.19
Probability Flow 4.36 1.56 0.0242 0.68
Intruder 1
Monte Carlo 0.63 - 0.2167 93432.37
Probability Flow 0.76 0.13 0.0193 0.4
Intruder 2
Monte Carlo 0.19 - 0.1193 93811.2
Probability Flow 0.162 0.028 0.0059 0.32
Net
Monte Carlo 3.593 - 0.51 245235.6
Probability Flow 5.241 1.648 0.0495 1.38
∗ compared to Monte Carlo simulation
† 3 × standard deviation for Monte Carlo, total estimated integration error for probab-
ility flow
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The results of this scenario are indicated in table 5.6 on the previous page for each conflict
event individually as well as for the associated net risk calculated using algorithm 3 on
page 68. This scenario is interesting because each probability of conflict calculated with
the probability flow method would not individually trigger a traffic advisory to the pilot
for an alert threshold of 5 %, but collectively would indeed trigger an alert. Furthermore,
the net “ground-truth” risk calculated using the Monte Carlo method would not trigger a
TA, when the net result calculated using probability flow would.
For the case of conflict with terrain, a standard deviation of 0.1506 % means that the true
probability of conflict lies on the interval [2.3482, 3.2518] %. For the conflict with intruder
1, a standard deviation of 0.0722 % means that the true probability of conflict lies on the
interval 0.4133, 0.8467] %. Lastly, for the conflict with intruder 2, a standard deviation of
0.0398 % means that the true probability of conflict lies on the interval [0.0707, 0.3093] %.
The true net probability of conflict is therefore contained on the interval [3.083, 4.103] %.
In comparison, the probability of conflict calculated using probability flow exhibits an er-
ror estimate of 0.0242 %, 0.0193 % and 0.0059 % for conflict with the terrain, first intruder
and second intruder respectively. The corresponding upper bounded probabilities of con-
flict therefore lie on the intervals [4.3358, 4.3842] %, [0.7407, 0.7793] % and [0.1561, 0.1679]
%. The overestimates for these conflict events can then be said to lie on the intervals
[1.084, 2.036] %, [0, 0.366] % and [0, 0.0972] % respectively. The net risk calculated using
probability flow is contained on the interval [5.1915, 5.2905] % with an associated error on
the interval [1.0885, 2.2075] %.
The accumulation of the probability of conflict over time can be seen in figure 5.20 for each
obstacle. From these graphs, it is seen that the predicted duration of conflict with the
terrain is 1.8 seconds, with the first intruder is 1.9 seconds and with the second intruder
is 2.25 seconds. This scenario, although unlikely, demonstrates that the probability flow
method is capable of predicting conflict in a complex environment in a relatively short
time (1.38 seconds).
5.4 Scenario 4: Aborted Landing
This scenario is modelled after the failed aborted landing that led to the crash of Asiana
Airlines flight 214 on the runway at San Francisco international airport (SFO) in 2013.
This scenario was chosen to test the performance of the probability flow algorithm in
predicting a fairly common form of CFIT accident. A Google map and corresponding
top-view of the meshed elevation data for the airport is shown in figure 5.21.
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Figure 5.20: Scenario 3: Accumulation of Risk over Time for Each Obstacle
Map data ©2014 Google
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Figure 5.21: Terrain Maps of San Francisco International Airport
The host aircraft descends at an average velocity of 148 knots towards the runway. At
19.38 seconds into the simulation, the aircraft aborts the landing at the beginning of the
runway and begins to ascend again for a go-around manoeuvre. The scenario is shown
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more in clearly in three-dimensions in figure 5.22.
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Figure 5.22: Scenario 4: 3D of Terrain and Aircraft Trajectory
In airport landing scenarios, it is difficult to decide how the runway should be handled
in the conflict detection module. The intent of the aircraft is to make contact with the
runway, which would result in the accumulation of an associated probability of conflict.
To resolve this problem, it is possible to remove the terrain mesh faces that lie exactly on
the runway. However, in an aborted landing scenario, any contact with the runway must
be seen as a conflict. The mesh faces that make up the runway are therefore kept in the
elevation map for this scenario. Mesh reduction techniques are, however, applied as they
are in scenarios 1, 2 and 3.
The effect of varying the surface integration error threshold over the interval [1.2864 ×
10−7, 1.2864 × 10−4] for this scenario is shown in figure 5.23. It is observed that the ex-
ecution time tends towards 0.41 seconds for ESTH ≥ 4 × 10−6 and no effect can be seen
on the uncertainty estimate. The surface integration error threshold is therefore constant
kept at ESTH = 1.2864× 10−7 for this scenario.
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Figure 5.23: Scenario 4: Effect of Surface Integration Error Threshold on Execution Time and
Uncertainty
Because the aircraft aborts the landing at 21 metres above the runway, excluding the ter-
rain mesh faces that lie outside 3 standard deviations of the mean Monte Carlo trajectory
means that only a small strip of the runway needs to be checked for conflict. As a result,
reducing the number of mesh faces using MATLAB’s reducepatch function needs to be
used sparingly to prevent the remaining mesh faces from becoming too large, distorting
the original shape of the terrain. The effect of varying the mesh reduction factor is shown
in figure 5.24 and 5.25.
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Figure 5.24: Scenario 4: Effect of Mesh Reduction on Execution Time, Uncertainty and PUBC
A linear decline in computation time is seen in figure 5.24(a) for increasing percentages
of mesh reduction with a slight increase in the estimate of uncertainty on PUBC . In figure
5.24(b), a large deviation in the calculated probability of conflict is observed for mesh
reduction above 60 %. Furthermore, the total mesh surface area suffers a sudden decline
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Figure 5.25: Scenario 4: Effect of Mesh Reduction on Surface Area and Maximum Triangle Size
for reductions larger than 60 % as seen in figure 5.25(a), reflecting a distortion in the
original shape of the terrain. This scenario therefore warrants to use of a maximum mesh
reduction of 60 %, ensuring that the estimate of uncertainty remains below 0.1 % while
still achieving a reduced computation time of 0.19 seconds. The maximum allowable tri-
angle size in the mesh pertaining to this scenario is 3079.4 m2.
The results of the aborted landing scenario are listed in table 5.7. Due to a standard
deviation of 0.071 % on the Monte Carlo probability of conflict, the true probability of
conflict lies on the interval [0.404, 0.83] %. The uncertainty of 0.0428 % means that the
upper bound to the probability of conflict lies on the interval [1.8142, 1.8998] %. The error
estimate on the true probability of conflict obtained using probability flow is therefore on
the interval [0.9842, 1.4958] %.
Table 5.7: Aborted Landing Simulation Results
Method PC (%) Error∗ (%) Uncertainty† (%) Running Time (s)
Monte Carlo 0.617 - 0.213 51233.31
Probability Flow 1.857 1.24 0.0428 0.19
∗ compared to Monte Carlo simulation
† 3 × standard deviation for Monte Carlo, total estimated integration error for probab-
ility flow
When the error estimate is larger than the probability of conflict itself, the overestimate
can especially be considered unreasonably large. As in scenario 2, the accumulation of
probability flow briefly occurs parallel to the conflict region i.e. the runway, and a large
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overestimate results. In this case, the overestimate is not large enough to change whether
or not a warning is issued to the pilot, but the importance of fixing this problem in the
probability flow algorithm is evident, particularly for small predicted probabilities.
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Figure 5.26: Scenario 4: Accumulation of Risk over Time
Figure 5.26 shows the accumulation of conflict over time using probability flow. The trend
is different to that of previous scenarios in that a very small conflict is detected 4 seconds
into the simulation before the majority of probability is accumulated between 16 and 22
seconds. The initial conflict could correspond to the slight risk of colliding with the sea
wall that separates the runway from the Pacific Ocean. The second conflict corresponds
to the risk of colliding with the runway at the instant of the aircraft’s lowest altitude when
the command to climb is issued.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
This chapter contains a summary of the results obtained in this thesis, a list of the most
important observations regarding the probability flow method and a few recommendations
for improvement of the algorithm.
6.1 Summary
This thesis describes the evaluation of the probability flow algorithm as a method of con-
flict detection in uncertain, cluttered, airport environments containing multiple dynamic
obstacles and hazardous terrain. In chapter 1, the general problem description, expected
results, significance and objectives of this thesis are outlined. This section summarises
how these objectives are met in each chapter of the thesis.
Through the review of literature in chapter 2, an understanding is achieved of the airport
environment, air traffic management systems and existing collision avoidance systems.
Additionally, various key methods that led to the development of the probability flow al-
gorithm are discussed in order to provide context and motivation as to why this algorithm
forms the primary focus of this thesis. To the author’s knowledge, it was found that only
the Monte Carlo and probability flow methods are capable of handling such a general
problem description of the aviation environment, containing multiple non-linear aircraft
systems, terrain, uncertainty and intent.
Chapter 3 describes the modelling of all relevant aspects of the airport environment. First,
a framework describing a collision avoidance system incorporating probability flow is pro-
posed. The conflict region of each aircraft is chosen to be spherical so as to avoid repeated
computation of the Minkowski sum as a result of uncertain changes in orientation at each
time step in the future. The idea of generating terrain data using the Google elevation
API is introduced and the motivation behind the selection of a Delaunay-based method of
triangulation is also discussed. Chapter 3 is concluded with the definition of the principal
and inertial axis systems used throughout the thesis as well as an introduction to the
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generic 6 degrees-of-freedom aircraft model.
The implementation of the modelling concepts discussed in chapter 3 as well as the imple-
mentation of probability flow and Monte Carlo methods is detailed in chapter 4. A brief
overview of the software structure is provided along with a discussion on the usage limits
and format of the HTTP requests used to generate terrain maps with the Google elevation
API. The chapter goes on to describe how disturbance is introduced into a Simulink air-
craft model to imitate uncertainty present in trajectory propagation before detailing the
implementation of cross-track and altitude controllers in the model.
Furthermore, chapter 4 discusses the initialisation of the aircraft model for effective Monte
Carlo simulation and the mathematical definition of the probability flow method is given.
The midpoint rule and Simpson’s rule are used to adaptively integrate the surface and
time integrals respectively present in the definition of probability flow. Problems were
encountered with insufficient dynamic memory in the generation of thousands of Monte
Carlo trajectories, but the problem is resolved by writing data to .bin files on disk. Lastly,
this chapter presents the novel application of the inclusion-exclusion principle for the cal-
culation of the net risk in scenarios containing multiple obstacles. It was found that the
net probability of conflict calculated using the probability flow method will still contain
an upper bound if at least one obstacle conflict probability in the scenario also contains
an upper bound.
The results of performing conflict detection with probability flow and the Monte Carlo
method in 4 different simulated flight scenarios is presented in chapter 5. Each scenario
is chosen to highlight different strengths and weaknesses of Van Daalen’s probability flow
method. The two-aeroplane example demonstrates that the method is capable of per-
forming accurate prediction of conflict in less than 1 second with little or no uncertainty
for scenarios in which the host and intruder aircraft diverge quickly after conflict is ini-
tially detected. The probability flow method therefore has the potential to detect mid-air
collisions with the same efficiency as TCAS, but with improved accuracy due to the in-
corporation of intent and uncertainty.
The terrain-only scenario in chapter 5 illuminates a shortcoming of the probability flow
method in that flying parallel to an obstacle conflict region results in a large overestimate
on the probability of conflict relative to the Monte Carlo simulation result. Moreover,
the longer the duration of conflict, the larger the overestimate will be. Aside from this
shortcoming, the algorithm still executes quickly for large areas of terrain with the assist-
ance of mesh reduction techniques. Mesh faces that lie outside of 3 standard deviations of
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the mean Monte Carlo trajectory are disregarded and the remaining mesh faces are effect-
ively simplified using MATLAB’s reducepatch function, thus reducing computation time.
Scenario 3 in chapter 5 demonstrates the ability of the probability flow method to accur-
ately handle scenarios containing multiple intruder aircraft as well as terrain. Although
conflict detection could not be performed in under 1 second as with the previous scen-
arios, an execution time of 1.38 seconds for such a complex scenario with a look-ahead
time of 42 seconds is reasonable. This scenario also successfully implements the recurs-
ive inclusion-exclusion principle algorithm as discussed in chapter 4 to calculate net risk
along the host aircraft’s path. The importance of this function is highlighted in that
individually each conflict event would not trigger an alert, but collectively would have
resulted in a traffic advisory to the pilot. Scenario 3 therefore clearly demonstrates that
the probability flow method could potentially perform the same functions as TCAS and
EGPWS, but as a single, integrated system. In this way, risk can be prioritised based
on urgency rather than the type of obstacle the risk is associated with. Furthermore,
this scenario makes it clear that large overestimates on the probability of conflict are not
obtained in mid-air collision scenarios, but only in scenarios involving large expanses of
terrain where the aircraft spends a relatively long time in the vicinity of the conflict region.
The final scenario in chapter 5 deals with an aborted landing at an airport. Like scenario
2, a large overestimate is obtained on a small probability of conflict due to the brief accu-
mulation of probability flow closely parallel to the airport runway. This scenario further
stresses the need for a solution to this problem if probability flow is to be successfully
implemented in an airport environment. Even though a large overestimate is present on
the probability of conflict, this scenario still demonstrates that probability flow is capable
of calculating risk associated with an aborted landing situation fairly quickly.
Analysis of MATLAB’s reducepatch function in scenarios 2, 3 and 4 shows that the
terrain data can be simplified to improve execution time, but the degree of possible mesh
reduction without compromising accuracy is dependent on the trend of the terrain and
type of scenario. Determining the optimal mesh reduction factor specific to each scenario
is an avenue of further research that would prove beneficial.
In conclusion, the probability flow method is a viable option for real-time probabilistic
conflict detection in the aviation context. Probability flow can accurately and quickly
predict brief mid-air and CFIT conflicts for a look-ahead time of up to 60 seconds. Using
probability flow allows flexibility in choosing the size of the conflict region and the range
at which conflict is detected.
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6.2 Probability Flow Observations
• Conflicts between aircraft are predicted more quickly than conflicts with the terrain,
but CFIT accidents are more prevalent than mid-air collisions.
• The number of triangles in the terrain mesh have a large influence on the algorithm
execution time and accuracy of the estimated risk.
• For a very small simulation sampling period, the size of the time integration er-
ror threshold plays little role in the result uncertainty and execution time of the
algorithm.
• A very small sampling period (≤ 0.01) is necessary in the aviation context to ensure
that conflict is not missed between samples for aircraft that travel at high speeds.
• Large overestimates on the probability of conflict are only obtained in scenarios in
which the aircraft spends a large amount of time in the vicinity of the conflict region.
This is particularly prevalent in CFIT scenarios containing large expanses of terrain
rather than mid-air collision scenarios where the aircraft conflict region is small.
6.3 Future Work
In this section, recommendations for the improvement of the probability flow method
are proposed. Considering the practical observations discussed in the previous section,
further work is required before this algorithm could potentially be implemented as part of
a legitimate air traffic management system.
1. Flying Parallel to Obstacles
The large overestimate that results from flying parallel to an obstacle surface bound-
ary needs to be reduced to ensure a tight upper bound on the probability of conflict
at all times. Flying parallel to a mountain or building is very dangerous and should
trigger a warning or resolution advisory regardless, but this problem needs to be
resolved if the occurrence of false alarms at airports operating parallel runways is to
be reduced.
Alternatively, a first order second moment approximation can be obtained of the
distorted aircraft state PDF after the accumulation of probability flow has taken
place. It can be assumed that the distorted PDF is still a Gaussian function with a
new mean and variance. Given that the original aircraft state PDF is described by
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the random variable X ∼ (x, σ2X) and Y = g(X) is a generic non-linear function of
X representing the distorted aircraft state PDF, the mean y and variance σ2Y can
be found. First, a linear Taylor expansion around x is used to replace g(X) with a
linear function of X [56].
Y = g(X) ≈ g(x) + dg(X)dX
∣∣∣∣
x
(X − x) (6.3.1)
The approximate mean value of the distorted PDF is then y = g(x) and the approx-
imate variance of the distorted PDF is given by
σ2Y =
( dg(X)
dX
∣∣∣∣
x
)2
σ2X . (6.3.2)
The problem with this method is that knowledge of the aircraft’s dynamics is required
to formulate g(· ). With the probability flow method, it assumed that pre-existing
data describing the mean and covariance along the predicted trajectory is readily
available, thus eliminating the need for knowledge of the aircraft’s dynamics. Fur-
thermore, calculating g(· ) at each time step of propagation parallel to an obstacle
will slow down execution time considerably.
The best solution is possibly to describe the aircraft state PDF as a sum of smaller
Gaussian functions. Each Gaussian function can then be propagated independently
and summed before being checked for conflict at each time step. The integral of a
Gaussian function curve is HX |σXn |
√
pi where HX is the height of the curve and σXn
is the standard deviation. Before conflict, the integral of the sum of all the Gaussian
functions must be equal to 1 – the value of the integral of the normal distribution
describing the aircraft state PDF. After a conflict has been experienced, however, the
probability that has flowed through the conflict region surface boundary is accumu-
lated and removed from the PDF. The resulting probability of conflict is essentially
the integral of the sum the individual Gaussian functions that experienced conflict.
The remaining Gaussian functions can then easily be individually propagated fur-
ther, while collectively still accurately representing the distorted aircraft state PDF.
The number of Gaussian functions used to approximate the aircraft state PDF will
no doubt influence the execution time and should be kept as low as possible. In
practice, the Gaussian functions can be represented using a basis function expansion
of a Gaussian function describing the aircraft state PDF.
2. Gaussian Assumption
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The most significant assumption made in the probability flow method, is that the
position and velocity aircraft state PDFs are jointly Gaussian. Scenarios may, how-
ever, arise in which the true position and velocity distributions are not Gaussian.
Future work could include a study of instances in which this would be the case and
the effect this has on the ability of the probability flow method to predict conflict
with a relatively tight margin of error.
In this thesis, it was found that operating the aircraft model beyond its aerodynamic
constraints, something which may be required in an emergency resolution scenario,
resulted in the deviation of the aircraft position PDF from its Gaussian form. The
resulting probability of conflict was therefore observed to be underestimated – a
crucial flaw if present in an aircraft conflict detection system. Moreover, it may be
possible to derive a formulation of probability flow for other types of distributions
using the sum of Gaussians method described previously in point 1.
3. Mean and Covariance
This thesis assumes knowledge of the position and velocity mean and covariance along
the future trajectory and uses Monte Carlo simulation to calculate these values. Ad-
ditional research into the field of efficient and accurate trajectory propagation could
assist in the characterisation of future uncertainty for varying aerodynamic modes,
manoeuvres and environmental factors.
Ideally, accurate trajectory propagation incorporating uncertainty and intent should
be performed in real-time. Alternatively, this research could assist in the creation of
a generic look-up table specific to particular aircraft models. A comparison between
results obtained using the look-up table and using Monte Carlo simulation could
provide a measure of the viability of using pre-defined values of uncertainty for dif-
ferent situations.
4. Integration Rules
A large bottleneck exists in the execution of the surface integral in equation 4.5.1
on page 61. Currently, the midpoint rule is used to adaptively estimate the surface
integral, but it is possible that other integration rules in the Newton-Cotes family
may be more efficient. Future work could include the testing of the trapezoidal rule,
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Milne’s rule and Boole’s rule to name a few.
5. Mesh Reduction
In this thesis, the MATLAB reducepatch function was used to reduce the number
of triangles used to represent the terrain mesh, thus reducing computation time.
The use of more sophisticated mesh reduction techniques should be investigated to
further improve efficiency without compromising accuracy in prediction.
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